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1 Introduction
The title of this Element is likely to induce two common reactions. One is
immediate scepticism, largely because the notion of the unity of science is
often associated with reductionism, and nowadays (almost) no one likes reduc-
tionism. The other is one of historical interest, as for many, the idea of the unity of
science brings to mind logical empiricism/positivism and perhaps the grandiose
goal of completed science. But it is the disunity of science that many authors are
now interested in – pluralism is driving the contemporary philosophy of science.
While this Element will touch on all these themes, its main target is elsewhere.
The present author conceives of ‘unity of science’ as an ontological ideal – the
thought that there is something that connects the various entities in reality, for
instance, by way of one thing being composed of various other things. We can
then ask a further question, for example, about whether the composed entities are
reducible to their components or not. This way of thinking about unity of science
clearly connects it with metaphysical themes about the structure of reality.
The concept of unity of science as an ontological ideal may be contrasted with
unity of science as an epistemic ideal, focusing on the connections between the
explanations and predicates of the scientific disciplines and scientific practice.
This conception is at least partly motivated by the prospect of interdisciplinary
research, for we do need to explain why it is useful to work across disciplinary
boundaries. According to this line of thought, unity of science may have
pragmatic or instrumental value, quite independently of reductionism. This
reaction takes it that while the old reductionist connotations should be aban-
doned and pluralism is indeed thriving, there is nevertheless still something of
value in the ideal of the unity of science.
This Element will start, in Section 2, by laying out a brief history of the unity
of science and outlining the main reasons for the shift from unity to disunity and
pluralism. Section 3 discusses the state-of-the-art regarding the unity of science,
which is often driven by the epistemic/pragmatic model of unity. Two case
studies will also be discussed, one from the biology-chemistry interface and one
from the chemistry-physics interface. In Section 4, I will put forward my own
conception of unity, following the ontological model.
We may ask: if the sciences are indeed disunified, then why is it possible to
examine some higher-level phenomenon in terms of lower-level phenomena?
Typically, the answer will have something to do with reduction – for example, we
can explain somehigher-level goings-on in terms of the behaviour of their parts. But
what kind of reduction is this? Does it mean that there really is nothing going on at
the higher level? Or does it merelymean that higher-level entities depend upon their
parts? These are questions that will have an important bearing on unity of science.
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A central claim of this Element is that there can be unity without eliminative
reduction. In other words, even if we can give an ontological basis for the
higher-level goings-on, say, in terms of their parts, this does not mean that we
have to abandon the higher-level terminology – this is a form of semantic anti-
reductionism. This still leaves open the question of the ontological basis of
unity. My preferred answer to this question, to be developed primarily in
Section 4, is that there is a singular ontological basis for unity in terms of
natural kinds, which are ultimately what all the sciences are concerned with.
The resulting view may be called natural kind monism: there is a single notion
of ‘natural kind’ and anything falling under that notion can be defined in terms
of the same general set of identity-criteria.1 Natural kind monism may seem
like a very controversial view, especially in the light of recent pluralistic
accounts of kinds. The view concerns only the fundamental notion of ‘natural
kind’, though: we need to postulate just one fundamental ontological category
to account for natural kinds. This still allows us to accommodate plurality
among higher-level kinds.
2 A Historical Overview of Unity
The notion of the unity of science is regularly connected to the notion of
reduction. The initial thought is that the sciences can be unified into a theory
of everything and that the theories within a single science, such as general
relativity and quantum theory in physics, can also be unified. The goal would
then be to ultimately reduce all higher-level phenomena to fundamental physics.
According to this line of thought, unity of science just means that fundamental
physics is what everything else is ultimately based on; the higher-level sciences
are somehow derivative. The non-fundamental, higher-level sciences are typic-
ally called special sciences.
One way of understanding unity of science is in terms of the unity of the
entities studied by the various sciences. The immediate challenge to this type
of idea is the apparent plurality of higher-level entities such as molecules,
biological organisms, and psychological states. How could such entities be
accounted for solely in terms of entities studied in physics, such as fermions,
bosons, and fields? This is where the notions of reduction and bridge laws
come in, as the various levels of scientific discourse need to be somehow
connected and one way to understand this connection is in terms of laws that
‘bridge’ the levels. A typical understanding of reduction is identity based.
1 What is a criterion of identity? This question cannot be fully settled here, but in my view, the
answer will involve giving an account of sortal terms such as ‘cat’ or ‘mountain’ (see Lowe
1989). So, in the present context, the thought is that natural kinds understood in the most general
fashion will fall under a singular sortal term because they share their general identity criteria.
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According to strict reductionism, phenomena in the higher-level special sci-
ences are identical to some complex lower-level (physical) phenomena. This
is an understanding of reduction as identity, which is what makes it ‘strict’.
Another traditional way of putting this is to say that the higher-level phenom-
ena are nothing over and above the lower-level phenomena. In contrast,
weaker forms of reductionism postulate relations that are weaker than identity
to explain the connections between the sciences.
The origin of the reductionist conception of unity of science can be traced to
the 1920s and 1930s, when the members of the Vienna Circle began writing
about reduction. Rudolf Carnap paved the way for a new form of strong
reduction, while Carl Hempel developed the deductive-nomological model of
explanation. In addition, Otto Neurath pursued a somewhat more pragmatic
approach to unity. Some of these different strands may be seen as culminating in
Ernest Nagel’s work on reduction (see Nagel 1961 for his most influential
contribution).2 Much that followed was, in fact, direct commentary on
Nagelian reduction, which emphasized the (logical) derivability of one theory
from another, with the help of bridge laws (see van Riel 2011). This line of
thought was further developed and systematised in a famous article by
Oppenheim and Putnam (1958). But it was soon discovered that the logical
empiricist approach was overly ambitious, and the extreme reductionist picture
fell out of fashion. By the 1970s, Jerry Fodor (1974) countered the ideal of the
unity of science with his own: the disunity of science. This has become a new
normal: almost no one now believes that we can unify the sciences in the
manner suggested by the strong reductionists. But to see why this is the case,
it is worthwhile to briefly examine the idea of Nagelian reduction and the work
by Oppenheim and Putnam that followed. This will be covered in Sections 2.1
and 2.2, before moving on to Fodor’s reaction and the debate with Jaegwon Kim
that followed, in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. The phenomenon ofmultiple realisability
has a key role in this debate, and the line of thought is finalised in Section 2.5
with a discussion of Louise Antony’s analysis.
Before we get started, a simple figure showing the varieties of unity
(Figure 1) might be helpful. This is by no means the only way to distinguish
different approaches to unity, and it should be noted that there are further
distinctions to be made in the various subcategories. Simplified as it is,
Figure 1 may give us a useful starting point. I will not provide detailed
definitions of these varieties yet, as some historical context will be needed to
2 See Cat (2017) for a more comprehensive discussion of the history of the unity of science, which
does, of course, go back much further than the Vienna Circle. On Nagel’s view, see, for example,
Needham (2010) and van Riel (2011), and on Neurath’s influence, see the articles in Symons,
Pombo, and Torres (2011).
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make sense of them. Accordingly, the following definitions should also be
taken as tentative rather than final. Note also that the various versions of
unity on the left-hand side and right-hand side are not necessarily mutually
exclusive and indeed sometimes they are explicitly combined in various
ways. Finally, while I have labelled two of the options as ‘disunity’, this
does not mean that there could be no sense of unity involved – disunity
merely entails a type of pluralism. The reader is invited to refer back to
Figure 1 as needed.
Ontological models of unity, as the name suggests, concern the ontological
structure of reality. They are intended to be objective models about how reality
is structured, whether levelled or not.
Reductive ontological unity suggests that all entities reduce to some base class
of entities, typically, those of fundamental physics.
Non-reductive ontological disunity suggests that reality may be structured
into non-reductive levels that are connected, for instance, by compositional
relations, where the composed entities are a genuine addition to reality.
Epistemic/pragmatic models of unity concern the structure of scientific theories
and are hence guided by epistemic, explanatory, or pragmatic considerations
relating to scientific practice.
Theoretical unity (or unity of formalism) suggests that a certain set of distinct



















Figure 1 Varieties of unity and disunity (author’s own work)
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Eliminative semantic unity suggests that all predicates of higher-level sci-
ences are identical to predicates of (fundamental) physics; hence all higher-
level explanations are, in principle, replaceable by lower-level (physical)
explanations.
Non-eliminative semantic disunity suggests that higher-level or special science
predicates cannot be identified with predicates of physics (traditionally because
of arguments frommultiple realisation); hence higher-level explanations cannot
be dispensed with and a type of pluralism is allowed. However, this view is
typically combined with the idea that all higher-level predicates refer to entities
that can be understood as being linked to lower-level entities (e.g., by using
compositional or mechanistic explanations). This type of combination of non-
eliminative semantic disunity and non-reductive ontological disunity is often
called non-reductive physicalism.
2.1 From Logical Empiricism to Nagelian Reduction
Unity of science was a driving ideal in the logical empiricist tradition. It was
closely tied to reductionism and an anti-metaphysical attitude, so the relevant
sense of unity was primarily following the epistemic/pragmatic model of unity
with a semantic focus on the language of science, but it may be considered to
have had an implicit ontological element as well. The resulting picture is
a combination of eliminative semantic unity and reductive ontological unity.
We can see all these elements in Carnap’s (e.g., 1928, 1934) work, and indeed in
his formulation of unity in the book entitled The Unity of Science: ‘all empirical
statements can be expressed in a single language, all states of affairs are of one
kind and are known by the same method’ (Carnap 1934: 32).
While this formulation focuses on semantic and epistemic unity, it certainly
suggests an ontological commitment to states of affairs of just one kind as well.
However, I will omit an analysis of Carnap’s metaphilosophical position (for
a related discussion, see Tahko 2015a). The important feature here is the
apparently anti-metaphysical background, which meant that unity of science
was conceived as an epistemological and methodological project attempting to
establish that all higher-level, special science statements, predicates, and
explanations are reducible into those of physics. The implicit ontological import
would then be that all entities also reduce to those of physics. These ideas were
clearly present in Carnap’s work. But instead of focusing on the well-reached
history of the logical empiricist position and details of the work of its main
architects, such as Carnap, we can directly jump to two of the core elements
regarding the development of the logical empiricist tradition towards
a systematic model of reduction and unity.
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These two core elements are Hempel’s (1942; Hempel and Oppenheim 1948;
Hempel 1965) deductive-nomological (DN) model of explanation and Nagel’s
(1961) account of reduction. Both of these elements focus on explanatory
connections. In brief, the DN model involves an explanandum, a sentence that
describes the phenomenon we wish to explain, and an explanans, which is
a class of sentences providing the explanation for the phenomenon. The deduct-
ive part of the model concerns the requirement that the explanandum must
follow from the explanans by logical consequence. The nomological (i.e., ‘law-
like’) part refers to the requirement that the explanans must contain at least one
law of nature, and without it the deductive inference would not be valid. For
example, take the universal generalisation that ‘all gases expand when heated
under constant pressure’ (Hempel 1965: 338), which may be regarded as a law.
According to the DNmodel, we can use this law and the fact that a given sample
of gas has been heated under constant pressure to explain why the sample of gas
has expanded.
Now let us connect the DN model with Nagelian reduction. Here is
a representative passage from Nagel himself: ‘A reduction is effected when
the experimental laws of the secondary science. . .are shown to be the logical
consequences of the theoretical assumptions (inclusive of the coordinating
definitions) of the primary science’ (Nagel 1961: 352). The basic form of
a Nagelian reduction suggests that theory A reduces to theory B if and only if
A is derivable from B with the help of any necessary ‘coordinating defin-
itions’, which are more commonly known as bridge laws or bridge principles;
these bridge laws can take the form of logical connections, conventions, or
empirical hypotheses (1961: 354). It is not difficult to see that the DN model
and Nagelian reduction are closely connected. In effect, the Nagelian model
suggests that the reducing theory explains the reduced theory (with the help
of bridge laws).
The DN model and Nagelian reduction dominated the philosophy of
science for a time, but they did also come under heavy criticism (see, e.g.,
van Riel 2014). We will not need to provide these details here, but it is
important that we understand the sense of unity that emerges from this
background: the upshot is that all higher-level science explanations ultimately
collapse into those of physics. But while the DN model and Nagelian reduc-
tion both operate at the epistemic level of explanation, there does seem to be
an implicit ontological commitment to the idea that all entities reduce to
(fundamental) physical entities. However, the difference between these two
aspects needs to be clarified. In Oppenheim and Putnam (1958), which is the
subject of the next section, we can find a clearer statement of the ontological
view.
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2.2 Oppenheim and Putnam on the Unity of Science
Oppenheim and Putnam (1958) distinguish three different unity theses:
• Unity of language (epistemological reduction)
• Unity of laws (implies the unity of language)
• Unity of science (in the strongest sense, implies unity of laws and unity within
a science)
Unity of language is described as the idea that all terms of science are reduced to
one discipline, such as physics, whereby ‘reduction’ would most plausibly be
understood definitionally. This would result in a type of epistemological reduc-
tion, where all the claims of the special sciences could, at least in principle, be
translated into claims of some more fundamental science. It is worth taking
a moment to pause and think what this would mean, if true. It would mean that
the vocabulary used in the special sciences – terms such as covalent bond, cell
wall, neuron, memory, and so on, could ultimately be replaced by ones of
a unified science. The idea could be understood as semantically eliminative,
in that all this higher-order vocabulary could be eliminated in favour of the
language of, say, fundamental physics. But even if we could eliminate all
higher-level language, it is a rather radical claim to say that we would do so.
There are individual cases where this has happened, though. To provide just one
example, the now thoroughly abandoned idea of vitalism suggested that there is
something fundamentally different about living organisms – namely, they are
non-mechanical, containing an ‘élan vital’ or vital force that gives life to
inanimate material bodies. The theory of vitalism involved a sophisticated
theory, but the notions employed by that theory, such as that of a vital force,
have been completely eliminated by contemporary science. By the late nine-
teenth century, the experimental progress of developmental biology and emer-
ging modern biochemistry, combined with the lack of any experimental support
for vitalism, made it clear that vitalism has no future (see Gatherer 2010 for
a short history of vitalism). However, it should be noted that a plausible
understanding of the unity of language should not entail full elimination of all
higher-order vocabulary. Even if it were possible in principle to eliminate such
vocabulary, it would surely be difficult – for instance, we do still talk about ‘life’
in a rather abstract fashion. Hence, there is room for non-eliminative semantic
disunity.
Unity of laws, as defined by Oppenheim and Putnam, is a stronger thesis than
unity of language. The thought is that all the scientific laws could be reduced to
the laws of one unified science. On the face of it, unity of laws seems to be
a more interesting thesis, as it does not focus on the individual terms used in
7Unity of Science
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science (albeit Oppenheim and Putnam do take it to imply unity of language).
The precise meaning of ‘reduction’ is left open by Oppenheim and Putnam and
I will do the same for the time being, but it appears that here we are moving
towards an ontological model of unity. I will shortly discuss an example, but it
may be helpful to do so in the context of the strongest sense of unity of science
that Oppenheim and Putnam entertain, as it explicitly mentions also the con-
nections within a discipline: ‘Unity of Science in the strongest sense is realized
if the laws of science are not only reduced to the laws of some one discipline, but
the laws of that discipline are in some intuitive sense “unified” or “connected”’
(Oppenheim and Putnam 1958: 4).
They specify immediately that the required ‘connection’ between the laws
should be something stronger than the mere conjunction of these laws. What
might qualify as this type of unification? A plausible candidate is provided by
electroweak unification – the successful effort to unify two of the fundamental
forces (and hence the laws concerning them), the weak force and the electro-
magnetic force. In fact, the electromagnetic force itself already unifies two
apparently distinct forces – namely, the electric force between charges which
is governed by Coulomb’s law and the magnetic force. The Lorentz force law
summarises both of these forces.
The unification of the weak and electromagnetic interaction is rather more
complicated, as it involves further exchange particles, namely the W and
Z bosons that are involved in weak interaction. Indeed, it was the prediction
and discovery of the Wand Z particles and the resulting unification of the weak
and electromagnetic interaction that led to the 1979 Nobel Prize in physics
being awarded toWeinberg, Salam, and Glashow. The press release announcing
the award serves to highlight just how deeply ingrained the search for unity in
science is:
Physics, like other sciences, aspires to find common causes for apparently
unrelated natural or experimental observations. A classical example is the
force of gravitation introduced by Newton to explain such disparate phenom-
ena as the apple falling to the ground and the moon moving around the earth.
Another example occurred in the 19th century when it was realized,
mainly through the work of Oersted in Denmark and Faraday in England,
that electricity and magnetism are closely related, and are really different
aspects of the electromagnetic force or interaction between charges. The final
synthesis was presented in the 1860’s by Maxwell in England. His work
predicted the existence of electromagnetic waves and interpreted light as an
electromagnetic wave phenomenon. . . .
An important consequence of the theory is that the weak interaction is
carried by particles having some properties in common – with the photon,
which carries the electromagnetic interaction between charged particles.
8 Philosophy of Science
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These so-called weak vector bosons differ from the massless photon primar-
ily by having a large mass; this corresponds to the short range of the weak
interaction.3
As the press release makes clear, a key part of the unification of the weak and
electromagnetic forces are the shared properties of the exchange particles. The
next step is to explain the primary difference, which has to do with mass. The
story continues with electroweak symmetry breaking, and the more recent
discovery of the Higgs boson, but we need not enter these complications.
What should already be clear is that the search for unity is one of the key values
of scientific inquiry, and indeed of the Nobel Committee, and there are many
celebrated examples of this in the history of science. No wonder, then, that
Oppenheim and Putnam attempted to systematise this idea.
We have so far omitted one important detail: when we speak of unification in
science or discuss cases such as the unification of the weak and electromagnetic
forces, it is not obvious that we are talking about ‘unity’ in the same sense that
Oppenheim and Putnam or contemporary philosophers always intend. There is
clearly something in common with these cases, which is why I have used
electroweak unification as an example of how the laws of physics might be
‘connected’ in the sense that Oppenheim and Putnam require. But we should
keep in mind the distinction between ontological models of unity and epistemic/
pragmatic models of unity. In particular, the case I have just described could be
understood in the sense of theoretical unity (or unity of formalism), so we
should consider this form of unity in more detail.
The idea behind theoretical unity is simply that we may discover a formal
(mathematical) framework, which manages to approximately model a certain
set of distinct phenomena. For a given purpose, it may be sufficient to use
a simple unified formalism. To continue our previous example, consider the role
of the electromagnetic force in holding together atoms and molecules. The
electromagnetic force is by far the most significant force in determining atomic
and molecular structure. It has an infinite range, just like gravity, but given the
extremely small masses of particles in the atomic scale, gravity is negligible.
The strong force, by contrast, is very strong indeed, but its range is very short –
it holds the nucleus together. The weak force has an even shorter range, 0.1% of
the diameter of a proton. If we are interested in the molecular range, it is really
just the electromagnetic force that matters. So, for most calculations that we
might wish to make concerning the molecular scale, it is entirely unnecessary to
consider gravity, even though gravity is in effect at all scales. Thus theoretical
3 Press release, NobelPrize.org, accessed 27 June 2019. www.nobelprize.org/prizes/physics/1979/
press-release.
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unity has an element of interest relativeness, which is useful and even necessary
for science, but it is not the type of ontological unity that some philosophers may
be interested in.4
In contrast, ontological models of unity concern the structure of reality rather
than the structure of theories. Yet, so far, we have not specified a properly
ontological as opposed to epistemological sense of reduction that might under-
lie such unity. Let us turn back to Oppenheim and Putnam, who also state that
they wish to set aside epistemological versions of the unity thesis (cf.
Oppenheim and Putnam 1958: 5). Relying on previous work by Kemeny and
Oppenheim (1956), they take reduction to be a relation between theories. This
may not quite capture the sense of ontological unity that I have just been
alluding to, but we should not be misled by this, for Oppenheim and Putnam
do specify that a key part of reduction is that a set of observational data
explainable by one theory is explainable by the reducing theory. This explana-
tory connection, we may assume, is supposed to track the ontological relation
between the phenomena that the theories describe. What is that relation?
Oppenheim and Putnam call it micro-reduction. As they specify, this relation
concerns the objects or entities that theories deal with, so it is ontological rather
than epistemological in the intended sense.
The idea of micro-reduction is something that survives in contemporary
philosophy (under different labels), so it is useful to consider it in some detail
(cf. microstructural essentialism, which we will return to later; see also Tahko
2015b). Micro-reduction is transitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric. As Putnam
and Oppenheim (1958: 7) observe, the transitivity of the relation is of particular
importance since it establishes a hierarchy of reductive levels. The thought is
that there must be more than one such level (rather than a ‘flat’ one-level
reality), there is a unique lowest level (such as fundamental physics), and
a common denominator for each level (any thing on one level, except for the
fundamental one, must be composed of parts on the level immediately below it).
In practice, this means that if psychology reduces to neuroscience and neurosci-
ence to biochemistry, then in virtue of transitivity, psychology will also reduce
to biochemistry. This strict hierarchical structure may seem controversial
because sometimes it does seem that we have to consider two levels at more
extreme ends. For instance, the field of quantum biology applies results from
4 Indeed, it is ontological unity that I am most interested in, instead of theoretical unity, which is
primarily epistemic. For a thorough discussion of theoretical unity (in physics), see Morrison
(2000). It is worth keeping this distinction in mind, because the pursuit of theoretical unity has
such an important role in science. It may often also point to ontological unity, but it does not entail
it. Note also that onemay of course be interested in both theoretical and ontological unity, as many
philosophers of science surely are.
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quantum mechanics directly to the realm of biological entities. But Oppenheim
and Putnam insist that we better not ‘skip’ any levels in this process, say, by
trying to explain psychology in terms of subatomic physics, as this would
indeed be ‘fantastic’ (ibid.). We now arrive at Oppenheim and Putnam’s pro-
posed account of the levels of science, represented by the pyramid in Figure 2.
Notice that a key idea driving reduction in Figure 2 seems to be a simple
parthood or composition relation: social groups are composed of living things,
which are composed of cells, which are composed of molecules, and so on. This
is a type of ‘building blocks’ conception of nature that has survived a long time
in philosophy and still enjoys support, e.g., in the form of a commitment to
a fundamental compositional level (see Tahko 2018 for discussion). Note,
however, that a commitment to a fundamental level does not by itself entail
such a conception – for one thing, there could be just one level, in which case the
‘building blocks’ idea would not be a good fit. Moreover, if the various levels of
entities in Figure 2 are thought to be genuinely existing, then the model at hand
would be compatible with non-reductive ontological disunity, while eliminating
the higher-level entities in favour of a singular level of elementary particles
would entail reductive ontological unity.
The result, then, is a hierarchical picture of the levels of reality which is
really driven by just one relation – namely, the parthood or composition
relation. This is effectively what the idea of micro-reduction amounts to on
the Oppenheim-Putnam line. However, it is worth keeping in mind that
Oppenheim and Putnam did not claim (and presumably would not claim
even now, more than sixty years later) that we already possess the tools to
perform this type of micro-reduction. Rather, ‘[t]he assumption that unitary









Figure 2 A system of reductive levels (author’s own work)
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itself as a working hypothesis’ (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958: 8). By
a ‘working hypothesis’, they mean that this idea should be justified on
empirical grounds, if and when we are able to establish this type of reduction.
They go on to support this idea (1958: 12ff.) in terms of theoretical virtues
such as the simplicity of the hypothesis and the variety and reliability of the
evidence in favour of it from the various sciences and successful inter-
theoretic reductions. They also put forward case studies from each of the
levels. Among the more famous case studies, partly because it was later
picked up by Fodor, is the case of Gresham’s law in economics.
Gresham’s law, which states that bad money drives out good, can be
illustrated with a simple example. In this example, ‘good’ money is money,
such as gold coins, where the nominal value (the face value) of the coin is
equal or close to equal to the value of the metal it is made of (the commodity
value), in this case gold. ‘Bad’ money, on the other hand, is money which has
a higher nominal value than commodity value. So, Gresham’s law states that
when ‘bad’ money is circulating along with ‘good’ money of the same
nominal value, it tends to drive out the ‘good’ money, since the higher
commodity value of the ‘good’ money is an incentive to hold on to it.
A consequence of this law was the practice of debasement, which could
unlawfully be done by the public – for example, by scraping off small
portions of gold from gold coins, while the coin retains its nominal value.
The reeded edges on coins, still present in many modern-day coins (such as
the two-euro coin), were intended to make this practice evident and hence
allow the recipient to deny a payment in such ‘bad’ money.
Oppenheim and Putnam suggest that we can analyse cases such as Gresham’s
law in terms of individual choices, where these choices are ordered by means of
an ‘individual preference function’ (1958: 17). Economists can then attempt to
explain the behaviour of social groups and the market in terms of these
functions. Indeed, Gresham’s law does seem to simply confirm the individual
preference to maximise profit: if you can pay for the same commodity with one
of two coins of equal face value, then it makes sense to choose the coin with
a lower commodity value. So, Oppenheim and Putnam take this to be
a successful case of explaining a ‘law’ of economics in terms of
a psychological ‘law’. But it is less clear how we can account for this individual
preference in terms of its composite parts at a lower level – presumably the
cellular level of neurons – as the micro-reductive account would ultimately
require. Even putting this worry aside, there is an important caveat, one that
later led Putnam to give up the reductionist account. This caveat concerns the
phenomenon of multiple realisability: many higher-level things or phenomena
can be realised by two or more lower-level things.
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2.3 Fodor on Multiple Realisability and the Disunity of Science
Jerry Fodor, in two very influential papers (1974, 1997), argues against a strong
form of reductionism and in favour of the autonomy of the special sciences. The
first of these papers reacts against the traditional Nagelian model of reaction
described in Section 2.1, while the second addresses a rejoinder to Fodor’s
original paper by Jaegwon Kim (1992). There are two important methodo-
logical points to note about this line of discussion that began in the seventies.5
First, very much unlike the logical empiricist tradition or Oppenheim and
Putnam’s traditional discussion, this new literature was concerned with meta-
physics of science (even though this notion was not used): the focus is on
notions of natural kind, property, realisation, and so on. These are metaphysical
notions that rarely feature directly in scientific theories, and we will discuss
their role in more detail later on. Second, despite the import from metaphysics
of science, there is in fact a much closer interest to actual scientific case studies –
a trend that we see continuing in contemporary metaphysics of science. The
latter methodological point is especially striking, given the supposed scientific
rigour of the logical empiricist tradition.
Fodor, in fact, starts by noting that the trend toward reductionism in philoso-
phy of science (at that point in the seventies), while driven by scientific
successes, is not thoroughly explained by it. Instead, Fodor thinks that many
proponents of reductionism are motivated by the relative generality of physics
when compared to the special sciences. But he thinks that this idea of the
generality of physics should be separated from a stronger sense of ‘the unity
of science’:
What has traditionally been called ‘the unity of science’ is a much stronger,
and much less plausible, thesis than the generality of physics. If this is true it
is important. Though reductionism is an empirical doctrine, it is intended to
play a regulative role in scientific practice. Reducibility to physics is taken to
be a constraint upon the acceptability of theories in the special sciences, with
the curious consequence that the more the special sciences succeed, the more
they ought to disappear. (Fodor 1974: 97)
The thought that the special sciences ought to disappear as they succeed is
indeed a rather strong doctrine. It reflects the strong reductionism of logical
empiricism and it may or may not be the case that Oppenheim and Putnam were
committed to something as strong as this, but such a view is certainly not very
popular today, even among those who would call themselves reductionists
(Rosenberg 1994, e.g., may be an exception). So, Fodor’s target is a very strong
5 Thanks to Carl Gillett for highlighting these issues.
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sense of unity, and so is his understanding of reduction. He characterises it in
terms of bridge laws, where predicates of the reducing and reduced science are
connected via an identity relation – for example, every event which consists of
x’s satisfying some neurological predicate S1 is identical to some event which
consists of x’s satisfying some biochemical predicate S2 and vice versa (cf.
Fodor 1974: 100). The resulting picture looks like a combination of reductive
ontological unity and eliminative semantic unity.
Let us return to Gresham’s law. One of Fodor’s central points is that not every
natural kind corresponds to a physical natural kind. The notion of a ‘natural
kind’ is here interpreted very liberally: it is a general term that captures
something that is in common among the instances of a kind. We will return to
the interpretation of natural kinds in much more detail in Section 3. So, monet-
ary exchanges, which are what Gresham’s law concerns, could be regarded as
a natural kind insofar as there is something in common among its various
instances. Fodor (ibid., 103; original emphasis) states the following: ‘I am
willing to believe that physics is general in the sense that it implies that any
event which consists of a monetary exchange (hence any event which falls under
Gresham’s law) has a true description in the vocabulary of physics and in virtue
of which it falls under the laws of physics.’ But Fodor then points out that since
monetary exchanges are realised by a vast variety of different realisers (not
just euro coins but also dollar bills, cheques, and ‘strings of wampum’), the
events being covered by the reducing science would have to be ‘wildly dis-
junctive’. The worry is that any disjunctive physical predicate that would be
able to cover all these instances of monetary exchanges would not express
a physical natural kind (and would not feature in laws of physics). Yet monetary
exchanges presumably have something interesting in common despite the
variety of different realisers. So, Fodor’s point is that there are other, higher-
level natural kinds in addition to physical kinds: ‘A natural kind like a monetary
exchange could turn out to be co-extensive with a physical natural kind; but if it
did, that would be an accident on a cosmic scale’ (Fodor 1974: 104). The upshot,
according to Fodor, is that economics is not reducible to physics and hence there
is no unity of science.
We have now arrived at a key turning point in the history of reductionism and
indeed the search for a unity of science. Even though Fodor did not yet use the
notion of multiple realisation in his 1974 paper, this is clearly the idea behind
the ‘wildly disjunctive’ realisers of monetary exchanges. But in fact, Putnam
had already discussed the idea of multiple realisation in the late sixties (Putnam
1967). Fodor (1974: 105) mentions Putnam’s ideas, but does not cite his work
(indeed, he cites only Chomsky besides himself!). A little later in the paper
(ibid., 108), he specifies that there is ‘an open empirical possibility’ that the
14 Philosophy of Science
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108581417
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 83.160.98.210, on 24 Nov 2021 at 12:34:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
realisers of a supposedly reducible higher-level natural kind predicate could
turn out to be ‘a heterogeneous and unsystematic disjunction of predicates in the
reducing science, and we do not want the unity of science to be prejudiced by
this possibility’. Fodor’s focus on predicates is problematic though, for why
should we think that any (or all) predicates of the special sciences should
correspond to genuine natural kinds? Indeed, we should not think so, any
more than we should think that Nelson Goodman’s famous predicate ‘grue’,
which applies to all things examined before some future time t if and only if they
are green but to other things observed at t or after it if and only if they are blue.
Of course, ‘grue’ is a perfectly legitimate predicate, and we can imagine that
such a made-up predicate could have some use in a specific scenario. Yet there is
no reason whatsoever to suppose that there should be a physical natural kind
predicate that corresponds to ‘grue’. As we shall see, it is thus better to focus on
properties rather than predicates, in order to avoid the clearly conventional
elements associated with predicates. I take this to be a serious flaw in Fodor’s
original criticism of reductionism. He concludes his 1974 criticism of strong
reductionism by saying that it is not ‘required that taxonomies which the special
sciences employ must themselves reduce to the taxonomy of physics’ (ibid.,
114). But this is something that a friend of reductive ontological unity can agree
with: ontological reduction does not concern the taxonomy of the special
sciences. In other words, reductive ontological unity is compatible with non-
eliminative semantic disunity. Admittedly, the strong version of reductionism
originally pushed by the logical empiricists in the form of eliminative semantic
unity does entail eliminativism regarding higher-level taxonomy, and this is
Fodor’s main target, but it would be a mistake to regard the unity of science
quite generally to be hostage to the unity of taxonomy.
2.4 Kim versus Fodor on Jade
Moving on to the next stage of the debate, we should take a closer look at
JaegwonKim’s famous discussion of multiple realisation concerning the case of
jade, along with Fodor’s reply to this case. This example was originally
introduced by Putnam (1975: 241), although for a slightly different purpose.
Kim summarises the case as follows: ‘[W]e are told that jade, as it turns out, is
not a mineral kind, contrary to what was once believed; rather, jade is comprised
of two distinct minerals with dissimilar molecular structures, jadeite and neph-
rite’ (1992: 11). He then introduces a supposed special science law stating that
jade is green and divides that into a conjunctive law, whereby jadeite is green
and nephrite is green. Here, ‘jade’ is of course supposed to refer to a higher-
level natural kind. But Kim, favouring reductionism, thinks that the special
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science law in question is not a genuine law, despite having the basic form of
a law and being able to support counterfactuals. This is because the law is not
projectible – it does not have ‘the ability to be confirmed by observation of
positive instances’ (ibid.). Kim’s case in favour of this conclusion is the
possibility that we only encounter one or the other of the realisers of jade
when trying to confirm the law stating that jade is green. This would only
support the projectibility of either jadeite or nephrite being green. The upshot,
according to Kim, is that jade is a ‘true disjunctive kind’ (Kim 1992: 12).
Now we get to Kim’s famous challenge for Fodor: he argues that special
science laws concerning ‘wildly disjunctive’ higher-level kinds are not genuine
laws, because they do not deal with genuine natural kinds. They can be reduced
to laws concerning lower-level kinds. But Fodor’s reply to this challenge is also
forceful; he denies that jade is paradigmatically multiply realisable in the first
place and, further, claims that the scenario Kim describes is just based on
a sampling error. However, Fodor does admit that jade is a true disjunctive
kind; what he denies is that this is the same thing as being disjunctively realised:
‘Jade is disjunctive because the only metaphysically possible worlds for jade are
the ones which contain either [jadeite], or [nephrite] or both. By contrast,
multiply based properties that are disjunctively realized have different bases
in different worlds. Pain is disjunctively realized because there’s
a metaphysically possible, nonactual, world in which there are silicon based
pains’ (Fodor 1997: 153).
For Fodor, the case of jade is not a genuine case of disjunctive realisation, so
he agrees with Kim that it is not projectible in the required sense. Moreover, the
disjunction is ‘closed’ in that in all cases we are dealing with either jadeite or
nephrite, and there are no further candidates. This constitutes a case in favour of
abandoning the special science law concerning jade and replacing it with lower-
level laws concerning jadeite and nephrite. But if we are dealing with an ‘open’
disjunction, then there are metaphysically possible worlds in which a property
has realisers that it does not have in the actual world – only this type of case
counts as genuine multiple realisation for Fodor (Fodor 1997: 156). So, the
corresponding lower-level laws would also have to be open, and Fodor insists
that ‘if there is a higher level property that subsumes all the disjuncts of an open
disjunction, then we will want to state our laws in terms of it’ (ibid., 158).
The idea behind Fodor’s open/closed distinction is, I take it, to postulate
higher-level kinds in order to get the desirable closed laws back, unless we can
point to closed lower-level laws. Fodor’s claim, then, is that while the case of
jade is closed, the case of pain (or other genuinely disjunctively realised
functional kinds – kinds which are defined in terms of what they do) may be
open and hence justify postulating higher-level kinds. Fodor summarises this
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idea with the following principle that he takes to govern our inductive practises:
‘Prefer the strongest claim compatible with the evidence, all else equal.
Quantification over instances is one aspect of rational compliance with this
injunction; reification of high level kinds is another’ (Fodor 1997: 159).
One thing that is striking about this debate is just how little scientific detail it
involves, especially when the key argument is supposed to be that it is science
that gives us the criteria according to which we ought to judge higher-level
kinds. This is particularly ironic since Kim and Fodor supposedly agree about
the case of jade. What they do not seem to realise is that jadeite and nephrite, the
supposed realisers of jade, are themselves higher-level kinds. In fact, Fodor
(1997: 154) makes a passing appeal to the commonly accepted Kripke-Putnam
framework of microstructural essentialism, stating that jade’s being jadeite or
nephrite is metaphysically necessary, just like it is metaphysically necessary
that water is H2O. According to this framework, kinds are defined in terms of
their microstructural essence. That’s how Fodor arrives at the judgement that
jade is not a genuinely disjunctively realised kind. But this goes against Kim
(1992: 24), who suggests that jade is to be defined in terms of its macrophysical
properties.
Fodor may think that his modal intuitions ‘are pretty clearly the right ones to
have’ (Fodor 1997), but it has been clear at least since Jaap van Brakel’s (1986)
work (see also VandeWall 2007) – over a decade before Fodor’s snarky remark –
that even the usual microstructural story about water is seriously wanting.6 In
particular, to arrive at the result that the case of jade is closed in Fodor’s sense,
we must rely on the controversial assumption that the macrophysical properties
of jade are irrelevant. This is the upshot of Fodor’s speculative scenario where
someone recreates the macrophysical properties of jade from melted bottle
glass. Fodor insists (based on the ‘pretty clearly right’ modal intuitions) that
the result would not be jade. But this already assumes that the higher-level kind
jade is genuine and to be defined in terms of the traditional microstructuralist
story. Rather than take this assumption for granted, we would do well to
consider what we know about jadeite and nephrite.
We know that jadeite and nephrite share many of their chemical properties yet
differ in terms of microstructure. Jadeite and nephrite are not exactly identical in
terms of their chemical properties. Jadeite (NaAlSi2O6) is somewhat harder and
less prone to scratches due to its dense crystal structure and higher specific
gravity – it is a pyroxene mineral. Nephrite (Ca2(Mg,Fe)5Si8O22(OH)2) is
a mineral in the actinolite-tremolite series. I would like to draw attention to
6 For a more recent, thorough discussion of the case of water and microstructuralism more
generally, see Needham (2011) and Tahko (2015b).
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one aspect of nephrite’s chemical formula: (Mg,Fe). This peculiar feature
means that different samples of nephrite can have varying proportions of Mg
and Fe. This is not just a feature of nephrite. Consider the common mineral
olivine, which also occurs in two varieties, a magnesium-rich and an iron-rich
variety; this is similarly reflected in its chemical formula, (Mg,Fe)2SiO4. The
chemical properties of olivine vary according to whether it is Mg-rich or Fe-rich
(e.g., only the latter can exist stably with silica minerals such as quartz). So, are
olivine and nephrite disjunctive kinds like jade in that they are realised, in all
possible worlds, either by the Mg-rich or the Fe-rich variety? Or are they
genuinely disjunctively realised, like Fodor takes pain to be?
In fact, neither answer seems correct. The reason is that minerals such as
olivine (and, more generally, feldspars and pyroxenes) are usually considered as
mixtures rather than compounds; they are more appropriately understood
as solid solutions.7 A solution is a form of mixture, but in this case, the solution
is of course much more rigid than the solutions we usually encounter. The
principle, however, is very similar. Think of a vinaigrette emulsion, which is
also a type of mixture: the olive oil and the vinegar are normally immiscible,
which means that they do not naturally form a homogeneous mixture. But by
shaking them into an emulsion, we have created a homogeneous mixture. This is
a simple example of the type of mechanism that we have in the case of solid
solutions as well.
The upshot is that we should define jadeite and nephrite as distinct kinds (if
they are to be understood as kinds at all), which, as Kim suggests, have been
classified as jade due to some superficial, macrophysical similarities rather than
some shared microstructural basis. Hence, if we follow Fodor’s microstructur-
alist criteria, there are good, scientific reasons to think that these minerals are
not genuine natural kinds at all; they are mixtures of two elements in close
proximity on the periodic table that remain in a stable, homogeneous state, e.g.,
when combined with silica minerals (compare this with VandeWall 2007 on the
case of H2O). This does not mean that the general microstructuralist approach
that Fodor relies on must fail, but in the case of the particular example being
discussed, Kim’s macrophysical approach is evidently much better supported
by scientific practice. Insofar as we wish to postulate higher-level kinds such as
jade, we ought to define them in terms of their macrophysical properties. In
scientific practice, jadeite and nephrite are clearly distinguished, since they
differ in terms of their chemical and many of their macrophysical properties,
but note that it may nevertheless be possible to adopt a theory that allows
7 For a more technical account, see, for instance, Nesse (2011) for an introduction to mineralogy
and solid solutions.
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genuine natural kinds to be macrophysically defined (cf. Hendry 2010,
Needham 2011, and Tahko 2015b; see also Seifert 2019).
It seems then that the case of jade certainly does not settle the debate between
reductionism and anti-reductionism – in that, Fodor is correct. But Kim’s
analysis of the case raises legitimate concerns about the anti-reductionist
approach. Let’s see if we can put our finger on these concerns independently
of the case of jade.
2.5 Are Higher-Level Kinds ‘Really There’?
Let us move on to an interesting analysis of the Kim-Fodor debate, by Louise
Antony:
[M]ultiple realizability is something of a red herring. What matters, funda-
mentally, is not whether there could be minds embodied in things other than
brains, but rather whether there is a level of reality beyond the level at which
brains are normally studied – whether psychological kinds are ‘really there,’
‘over and above’ the already recognized kinds in chemistry, biology and the
other established sciences. (Antony 2003: 8)
The crucial question is: what makes a kind ‘real’ and can disjunctive kinds
indeed be ‘real’ in the relevant sense? Antony draws on a suggestion from
Lenny Clapp (2001), arguing that disjunctive properties can indeed be ‘real’ in
cases where the disjuncts ‘have real commonalities’ (Antony 2003: 10). The
question then turns entirely on whether there is such a real underlying resem-
blance in the case of disjunctive predicates.
Somehow, the anti-reductionist must define an objective sense of higher-level
‘reality’. But I find Antony’s ultimate case for this unconvincing; she suggests,
very much in line with Fodor, that there is a ‘strong abductive argument from
the projectibility of higher-level predicates to the reality of the kinds they
designate’ (ibid., 13). The idea is that the disjunctive predicates designating
‘real’ kinds are necessarily co-extensive with some projectible predicates (but
she qualifies that this is merely a sufficient rather than a necessary criterion).
Antony suggests that this is the case with many predicates ‘entrenched’ in
human language – reflecting Nelson Goodman’s view in letter even if not in
spirit (since Goodman was deflationary about projectibility). However, as
Antony immediately acknowledges, there is an issue that might easily under-
mine such an argument: there are plenty of projectible higher-level predicates
that are suitably entrenched in human language, but which we surely do not
wish to reify as genuine, higher-level natural kinds. Two examples of this are
‘witch’ and ‘angel’ – predicates that we clearly do not believe to correspond
with genuine natural kinds. However, both ‘witch’ and ‘angel’ may be
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projectible, because we can, for instance, make true generalisations about the
women labelled as witches in the Middle Ages. It is just that those generalisa-
tions are not true because these women were witches with some supernatural
skills, but rather because they were women who were all oppressed for some
social or political reasons. So, what should we say about such cases?
Antony has an interesting suggestion about how to deal with this. One could
try to deny that the abductive argument goes through (and hence deny the
entrenchment of predicates like ‘witch’) in these cases, because there really
have not been that many successful predictions made using these predicates. Or
one could explain the entrenchment in terms of something else than what the
supernatural connotations regarding ‘witch’ or ‘angel’ suggest, namely, in terms
of socio-political groupings, as suggested previously. The reason why this
suggestion is interesting is that it gives us a nice way to distinguish between
eliminativism and reductionism:
[T]he eliminativist about the mental denies that mentalistic predicates are
projectible. Such a person disagrees with the mental realist about the robust-
ness of our psychological attributions, denying either that there are any
substantive predictions that can be made on the basis of such attributions,
or else that the predictions that are so based are successful. The reductionist,
on the other, agrees that psychological predicates are projectible, but thinks
that they are so only because they track biological kinds. (Antony 2003: 14;
original emphasis)
Antony’s proposal nicely illuminates the eliminativism-reductionism distinc-
tion. Both are strategies to avoid including things like witches and angels among
the genuine natural kinds. So, could one of these strategies apply in the case of
jade?
Antony does not seem to think so. Like Kim and Fodor, she disqualifies jade
from the class of ‘real’ natural kinds, appealing to Fodor’s argument (based on
the distinction between open and closed disjunctions), which we outlined in the
previous section: ‘It’s a mere accident that both jadeite and nephrite count as
jade; there is nothing that the two mineral kinds [jadeite and nephrite] really
have in common’ (Antony 2003: 15). Or even if there is, she continues, it is not
in virtue of the observable macrophysical similarities that we count jadeite and
nephrite as jade, contra Kim – this reply reflects the case of witches and angels.
But I think that here’s where the anti-reductionist strategy that Antony develops
breaks down: ‘jade’ satisfies all the criteria that were given for ‘real’ kinds in
Antony’s theory. It is entrenched in human language, and it is entrenched
precisely because there is a set of higher-level, macrophysical properties that
we associate with ‘jade’ and that we value, such as aesthetics and ease of
working into exquisite objects (cf. Hacking 2007a: 276; LaPorte 2004:
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94–100). These properties are had both by jadeite and nephrite because, despite
the differences in microstructure, both result in sufficiently (from the point of
view of entrenchment) similar macrophysical properties. So, the abductive
argument goes through here and it cannot be explained away by either of the
strategies that Antony entertains. The reason for this is that we did not make any
mistake here about what is projectible about jade –we were always interested in
the macrophysical properties of jade, whereas in the case of witches we were,
supposedly, interested in their dealings with the devil. Indeed, it is useful to refer
to both jadeite and nephrite with the same term precisely because they share
roughly the same, valued macrophysical properties, and it is these properties
that secure its projectibility.
It should be getting clear what the upshot of all this is for the unity of science.
Everyone agrees, we were told, that jade is not a ‘real’ natural kind, and hence
not a legitimate counterexample to Fodor’s account of the disunity of science.
But the criteria for ‘real’ make jade every bit as real as the postulated higher-
level kinds that the anti-reductionists typically wish to reify. I think that a more
systematic account of what it takes for something to be a genuine natural kind is
needed. If it turns out that there really are genuine, irreducible higher-level
natural kinds, then the traditional pluralist argument for the disunity of science
is back in business. But if we can unify our theory of natural kinds and either
reduce or explain away the supposedly irreducible kinds, then higher-level
kinds do not threaten reductive ontological unity. Fortunately, there has been
plenty of progress in our theory of natural kinds in recent years. In Section 4, we
will return to the issue of natural kinds and its connection to unity. But first, we
should discuss the state of the art regarding unity of science.
3 Combining Unity and Pluralism
We have now seen that there are many different ways to interpret the unity of
science: in terms of the various theories, models or formal frameworks used in
science, in terms of laws and kinds postulated in science, and in terms of
dependence relations like composition that connect the entities studied in
science. An important distinction introduced in Section 2 in this regard is the
one between ontological and epistemic/pragmatic models of unity (the reader is
invited to refer to Figure 1). We have also seen that the phenomenon of multiple
realisability led to the popularity of different forms of pluralism, whereas strong
forms of reductionism have been largely abandoned. Moreover, where reduc-
tionism is still pursued, there has been a shift of focus from global reductive
projects towards local reduction. We can also see an active focus on attempts to
clarify the notions of reduction, multiple realisability, and emergence (e.g., van
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Riel 2014, Wilson 2015, forthcoming, Gillett 2016, Polger and Shapiro 2016,
and many others). Each of these topics is worthy of books longer than this
Element, so I will not attempt to do justice to all the nuances in this literature.
We have discussed reduction and multiple realisation in some detail already, but
we should briefly note the connection to emergence as well.
Emergence can very generally be described as the combination of depend-
ence with autonomy: something is emergent if it depends on something else but
nevertheless maintains some important sense of autonomy. The literature is full
of debate about what constitutes the relevant senses of dependence and espe-
cially autonomy. In the present context, a potentially more interesting feature is
the relationship between reduction and emergence. In particular, emergence is
typically considered to contrast with reductionism – one possible sense of
‘autonomy’ is simply ‘non-reducible’. Yet it is certainly possible to combine
weak forms of reductionism and weak forms of emergence. A helpful distinc-
tion can be made between weak emergence and strong emergence (e.g., Wilson
2015). Weak emergence in its various forms is quite widely accepted, since it
generally requires some modest form of autonomy for the emergent (higher-
level) phenomenon; this could be as simple as the emergent phenomenon being
unexpected or independent with regard to some minor changes in its depend-
ence-base (lower-level phenomena). An example of weak emergence might be
the various surprising products of evolution (such as intelligence). Wemight not
fully understand or expect to see all these products, but we know that they are
the result of complex biological and chemical processes. Strong emergence is
much more controversial, as it requires autonomy to a very high degree – for
example, it is common to think that a strongly emergent phenomenon is not
even in principle deducible from lower-level phenomena. It is unclear whether
strong emergence exists, but consciousness is often suggested as a potential
candidate.
This very brief introduction to emergence is not supposed to be comprehen-
sive, but I hope that it suffices to demonstrate why someone interested in unity
of science might also be interested in emergence – for strong emergence would
seem to immediately challenge at least the possibility of stronger forms of unity,
since it prevents strict reduction and arguably also weaker forms of reduction.
Moreover, the autonomy of emergent phenomena, even when the emergence is
weak, does call for further elucidation. Importantly, there may be ways of
understanding that autonomy that pose challenges for reductionism.
Accordingly, there is much to explore regarding the interplay of these various
notions. I will make some further remarks about this interplay where relevant in
what follows, but a thorough discussion of emergence will have to take place
elsewhere.
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In any case, even if some higher-level phenomena are emergent, there is also
a sense of unity that we need to account for. One pressing issue here is precisely
the sense in which unity of science may or may not be compatible with the
autonomy of the special sciences. In other words, can we combine a sense of
unity and pluralism? We can see this theme already in the discussion between
Fodor, Kim, Antony, and others, where the role of multiple realisability is
central. It could be said that the attempt to accommodate the phenomenon of
multiple realisability while maintaining a form of ontological reductionism is
one way to combine unity and pluralism. But in more recent literature, we can
find sophisticated attempts to adopt a sense of pluralism without necessarily
focusing on multiple realisability. I will start by tackling this issue, before
presenting two case studies where we see the combination of unity and plural-
ism in action. The notion of ‘pluralism’ could mean a number of things, such as
a plurality of composed and component entities and kinds or a plurality of
higher-level explanations and predicates. These two broad senses of pluralism
roughly correspond with the distinction between ontological and epistemic/
pragmatic models of unity. In what follows I will understand ‘pluralism’ in
the second sense (i.e., as a type of semantic pluralism about higher-level talk).
However, we will return to ontological forms of pluralism in Section 4.
There is a sense in which a modest interpretation of unity of science is
obviously true. This sense is appropriately captured by Sandra Mitchell
(2002: 55), who asks, ‘[I]f science is representing and explaining the structure
of the one world, why is there such a diversity of representations and explan-
ations in some domains?’ So, insofar as the world is, in some sense, a unified
whole, why do our scientific methods not follow suit? This is an important
question, but it should be immediately noted that it is primarily a question about
scientific practice and our epistemic limitations, and hence in the realm of
epistemic/pragmatic models of unity. One reaction to the question, which
Mitchell herself considers, is to say that the variety of different methods and
models in science is a sign of incomplete science. That is, since we do not yet
have a full picture of the world, it is understandable that science approaches the
world in a piecemeal fashion, sometimes with incompatible methods and
models, while ultimately pursuing theoretical unity. This would make pluralism
a purely epistemic issue. But even though science certainly sometimes proceeds
towards theoretical unity, this is not always the case even if an integrated model
were available. The reason for this, as Mitchell notes, is the complexity of the
subject matter. It is simply not effective to strive for theoretical (or methodo-
logical) unity across the sciences, because scientific research would be less
effective without a plurality of approaches. Now, this does not mean that unity
of science has been lost; rather, it means that pluralism thus conceived is an
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epistemic or pragmatic issue. We can see elements of this type of pluralism in
the work of Nancy Cartwright (e.g., 1999) andWilliamWimsatt (1987) as well,
but Mitchell’s integrative pluralism goes somewhat further in endorsing com-
peting, idealised models in science. However, the resulting pluralism of models
does nothing to undermine ontological models of unity (nor is it intended to do
so): as Mitchell concludes, at the theoretical level, pluralism is allowed (even
required), but at the ‘concrete explanatory level’ (i.e., when the models are
interpreted and applied to the real world), integration is required (Mitchell
2002: 66).8
I believe that something in the lines of Mitchell’s quite sensible approach to
pluralism is now a widely shared view, although there are exceptions – those
who think that a more radical, metaphysical pluralism is required or who favour
eliminative semantic unity. But how does this type of epistemic/pragmatic
pluralism compare with ontological models of unity? What is the underlying
metaphysical picture here? One thing that is striking is that even though the
possibility of combining theoretical or methodological pluralism and onto-
logical models of unity does seem to be widely accepted, there have been
very few attempts to clarify the underlying metaphysics, Carl Gillett’s work
being one notable exception. Perhaps part of the reason for this is that this
metaphysical picture generally has reductionist elements, and reductionism, for
many, still has an unfavourable ring to it (for a classic example, see Dupré
1983). But once we acknowledge that even reductive ontological unity does not
entail semantic eliminativism, and is hence fully compatible with non-
eliminative semantic disunity and theoretical pluralism, there is no reason to
associate it with eliminative semantic unity of the form adopted by the logical
empiricists.
To see all this, it is finally time to specify the type of reductionism that we
may associate with reductive ontological unity. This type of ontological reduc-
tionism is a relatively weak form of reductionism (cf. also Oppenheim and
Putnam’s ‘micro-reduction’, discussed in Section 2.2):
Ontological reductionism (OR): The view that true statements about higher-
level phenomena are made true fully and only by lower-level phenomena.
8 Compare this also with Breitenbach and Choi (2017), who argue that despite the plurality of
methods in science, a commitment to the unity of science as a regulative ideal is useful. Their
account is explicitly epistemic – in other words, Breitenbach and Choi consider ideal unified
science to be a useful epistemic aim, even if it were unreachable in practice. Other recent
primarily epistemic accounts of unity can be found in Nathan (2017) and Patrick (2018), but
the best-known account is probably Philip Kitcher’s, going back at least to Kitcher (1981), so this
is not exactly a new trend.
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Here, the relevant phenomena may be understood, for example, as properties,
kinds, powers, individuals, or mechanisms. The thought is that, for instance,
statements about a higher-level entity that is composed of lower-level entities
are made true by those component entities. It is important to see that OR does
not suggest that we should replace our statements about higher-level entities
with statements about lower-level entities. Hence, OR does not entail elimina-
tive semantic unity, it is not eliminative about higher-level talk. This point about
the compatibility of ontological reductionism and anti-eliminativism has prob-
ably not been fully appreciated, even though it has been made, sometimes
implicitly and sometimes explicitly, by several authors in recent work (e.g.,
Heil 2003a, Gillett 2007, Wilson 2010, and Strevens 2012).
For instance, as Gillett outlines the view he calls ‘new reductionism’, our
focus should be on the ontological relations between the relevant entities that
the sciences investigate (again, the relevant entities may be properties, kinds,
powers, individuals, mechanisms, or something else, see the articles in Aizawa
and Gillett 2016 for some examples). Gillett explicitly states that his own
version of this, dubbed compositional reductionism, should be combined with
semantic anti-reductionism about ‘special sciences and their predicates’ (Gillett
2007: 195). Semantic anti-reductionism is the view that we can maintain the
higher-level kind predicates and special science practices, while at the same
time acknowledging that there is a lower-level story that we can tell about those
practices. Gillett’s compositional reductionism is one way to tell this story, as it
‘takes our initial ontological commitments to both component entities and
composed higher-level powers, properties, individuals and processes, and
reduces them to a commitment solely to one layer of truthmakers in the relevant
component entities’ (ibid.). The resulting picture is eliminative in another sense
though, as it eliminates a commitment to higher-level entities as truthmakers for
higher-level talk. So, while we may postulate compositional and other relations
between higher-level and lower-level entities, strictly speaking, these do not
exist because the higher-level entities do not exist. However, I will reserve the
term ‘eliminativism’ for semantic eliminativism and talk about ontological
reductionism and reductive ontological unity to capture this ontological sense
of eliminativism.
Michael Strevens makes a related point in terms of explanation: ‘[E]xplana-
tory physicalism is perfectly compatible with the view that the explanation of
certain phenomena is best conducted at a rather abstract level, omitting those
details of physical implementation that make no difference to the phenomena’s
obtaining’ (Strevens 2012: 755). Here, ‘explanatory physicalism’ is the view
that everything that can be explained can be explained physically. Strevens then
goes on to argue that the abstract level of explanation of the higher-level
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sciences involves properties that are irreducible. But as a matter of fact, this is
a little underspecified, because Strevens thinks that a property is irreducible
‘just in case it cannot be defined in physical terms’ – by using physical
vocabulary (Strevens 2012: 755–756). So, the point seems to be very much in
line with what Gillett calls semantic anti-reductionism: we need the predicates
of higher-level sciences for our epistemic, explanatory purposes. In other
words, the focus is really on higher-level predicates rather than, say, higher-
level natural kinds. Contrary to what Strevens (ibid.) somewhat misleadingly
claims, this is not a sense of irreducibility that is ‘very strong’. In fact, it is just
about the weakest form of irreducibility that there is, as it only requires that
some higher-level predicates are indispensable for our explanatory needs,
where ‘explanatory’ is to be understood as an epistemic rather than
a metaphysical notion. Why would anyone deny this?
Strevens does make one very interesting additional contribution, which is
a significant improvement over the traditional debate concerning reductionism.
This is his point about the need, or lack thereof, for bridge principles (or bridge
laws), which would provide necessary and sufficient conditions enabling
a reductive connection between two levels. Already in our discussion of the
debate between Fodor and Kim, we saw that this type of link is likely to be too
strong a requirement, reminiscent of Nagelian reduction. Clearly, such bridge
principles are rarely available – a point that Strevens bolsters.
I should mention that the physicalism that Strevens has in mind here is of
course of the ‘non-reductive’ sort: even if some higher-level kinds are irredu-
cible, they are still physically realised (cf. Strevens 2012: 756). In other words,
every instance of money is physical (even bitcoins), even if the kindmoney is, in
some sense, not. This is apt to cause some terminological confusion, but the
distinction is a familiar one: the ‘non-reductive’ or ‘token’ physicalist view is
contrasted with fully reductive ‘type’ physicalism. The same is true for Jessica
Wilson’s version; she outlines and argues in favour of weak emergence, which
is enabled by the elimination of some degrees of freedom regarding the weakly
emergent entity’s realisation base (for details, see Wilson 2010: 292). The more
general idea underlying this form of weak emergence is that weakly emergent,
high-level entities may be stable with respect to some lower-level changes
(degrees of freedom). This type of idea is further developed by Knox (2016)
and Franklin and Knox (2018). So, all of this can be made much more rigorous.
(Wilson herself does so as well, using the powers-based subset strategy; for
discussion regarding this strategy, see Gillett 2010, Wilson 2011, and Tahko
2020.) But instead of going through the various abstract frameworks, I shall, in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3, attempt to illustrate how all this is supposed to work with
two case studies.
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Before we get to the case studies, let me briefly return to the initial question of
this section: the combination of unity and pluralism. What I consider to be the
best way of reconciling them has been anticipated in some much earlier work as
well. I have in mind the type of ‘non-reductive unity’ outlined by Harold
Kincaid (1990). Kincaid’s main concern is a little different – he is mainly
interested in showing that molecular biology is not reducible to chemistry.
This conclusion is supported by the usual suspects of multiple realisability
and broader context-sensitivity of the realisation base. Moreover, Kincaid
(1990: 576) conceives of the relevant notion of reducibility in terms of theories
linked by bridge laws, which is an approach that we have already questioned,
since it misconstrues the relevant sense of ontological reductionism at hand. For
instance, he suggests that ‘if the goal of reduction is to completely replace
higher-level explanations by those at the lower-level, then it is essential that
lower-level explanations proceed in entirely lower-level terms’ (Kincaid 1990:
577). Interestingly, just as Strevens targets (contrary to what he claims) a very
weak sense of irreducibility, Kincaid has here instead picked up, as his target,
the strongest possible sense of reducibility, which is incompatible even with
semantic anti-reductionism and hence non-eliminative semantic disunity. (He
cites Rosenberg as someone who may be committed to this type of strong
reductionism, i.e., eliminative semantic unity; cf. Rosenberg 1985, 1994,
2006.) This seems to be a repeating pattern in the literature surrounding
reductionism and unity of science: if one targets extreme forms of either
reductionism or pluralism – or indeed confuses ontological and epistemic/
pragmatic models of unity – then one can find an easy target. But in any case,
it is not this aspect of Kincaid’s proposal that I am presently interested in.
Instead, I would like to focus on Kincaid’s positive story about the unity of
science. He pitches this as ‘unity without reduction’, but of course wemust keep
in mind, again, that it is eliminative semantic unity and the associated semantic
reductionism that he seems to have in mind, whereas reductive ontological unity
is sidestepped.
Here is the core of Kincaid’s positive proposal: a non-reductive unity of
science is based on ‘interconnection and dependencies between theories that
nonetheless do not allow for one theory to replace the other’ (Kincaid 1990:
589). While he formulates this idea in terms of theories, the more detailed
outline he provides makes it clear that it is the actual entities described by these
theories that stand in the relevant dependence relations. For instance, the very
first potential ‘interconnection’ he describes states that every entity described
by one theory may be composed of entities described by the other. This is
straightforwardly compatible with the type of compositional reductionism that
Gillett has developed. Other types of interlevel dependence that Kincaid
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mentions include supervenience, heuristic dependence, and confirmational
dependence, some of which do not directly concern the underlying ontology,
given that, e.g., heuristic dependence has strong epistemic elements. But the key
point is that these ontological interlevel dependencies do not entail eliminative
semantic unity, and hence all of this seems to be compatible with a type of
pluralism about higher-level phenomena.
The upshot of these various attempts to find room for higher-level sciences
and hence a type of pluralism while maintaining unity of science (and a form of
ontological reductionism) is that much of the work to be done concerns the
various dependence relations which together unify the various sciences. These
dependence relations are the ontological framework that provides the full
picture for the unity of science, but the complexity of this framework is what
simultaneously enables the relative autonomy of some higher-level phenomena
(with respect to some lower-level degrees of freedom). Let me now put this new
outline for a framework for the unity of science, in the spirit of new reduction-
ism, combining reductive ontological unity and non-eliminative semantic dis-
unity, to some use.
3.1 Biochemical Kinds and Special Science Laws
I will consider biochemical kinds such as proteins as the first example.9 These
kinds are at the intersection of biology and chemistry, making them an interest-
ing case of potential cross-cutting and/or reduction/emergence (for discussion,
see, e.g., Slater 2009, Tobin 2010b, Goodwin 2011, Bartol 2016, Havstad 2018).
Proteins are macromolecules, and if macromolecules are considered to be
chemical kinds, we would typically explain their chemical properties in terms
of their physical structure, in line with traditional microstructural essentialism.
But when considered to be biological kinds, the role of these molecules in
physiological processes is important. This role is typically called the (bio-
logical) function of the kind. The function is also tied to evolutionary or
aetiological considerations, given that biological functions are the result of
a causal sequence of evolutionary processes.10 The key question is of course
the relationship between the complex biological aspects, which also involve
extrinsic, historical properties, and the microstructural, chemical aspects. For
instance, one might suggest that a protein’s three-dimensional structure super-
venes on its amino acid sequence. This idea can be illustrated with simple
9 This discussion builds on Tahko (2020).
10 I will omit a discussion of the complicated case of aetiological properties here, but see Tahko
(2020) for a case study involving this aspect as well.
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textbook models of protein structure, such as the structure of haemoglobin in
Figure 3.
But even though there is clearly a compositional dependence relation
between the primary structure (amino acid sequence) of a protein and the
resulting (tertiary and quaternary) three-dimensional structure, the exact rela-
tionship between these aspects is much more complicated. Indeed, many have
argued that protein folding is a challenge even for weak forms of ontological
unity, and accordingly provides a strong case in favour of disunity or pluralism
(e.g., Dupré 2012: ch. 9; Bartol 2016, Havstad 2018). Yet not everyone thinks
that this case undermines ontological reductionism (OR) as we defined it at the
beginning of Section 3 (e.g., Goodwin 2011, Tahko 2020).
William Goodwin’s case in favour of ontological reductionism draws on an
analogy with organic chemistry, where we may classify molecules into distinct
functional types, not unlike proteins. Organic molecules can be classified
depending on their molecular and reactive environments, but their behaviour
in these environments is nevertheless considered to result from molecular
Figure 3 Textbook model of haemoglobin.
Source: OpenStax College (2017): ‘Organic Compounds Essential to Human
Functioning’ (CC-BY 4.0), available at https://legacy.cnx.org/content/m46008/1.8/.
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structure (which should also be conceived of three-, or in fact four-
dimensionally because the structures are dynamic in time). In other words,
chemical kinds, for better or worse, are just as ‘messy’, to use Joyce
Havstad’s term, as biochemical (or biological) kinds (on ‘messy’ lab work,
see Schickore 2008: 329; see also Rosenberg 1985: 76). As Goodwin (2011:
543) puts it: ‘The tertiary structure of a protein, when there is one, represents the
most energetically stable conformation available to the protein in the relevant
biological circumstances.’ So, the process of protein folding, which can produce
different tertiary structures from one primary structure, may be understood as
being governed by complex interaction with the environment, aiming towards
the most energetically stable conformation.
To illustrate that chemical kinds as well are ‘hostage’ to their environment, it
might be helpful to briefly discuss a classic example of a rather problematic pair of
chemical kinds: acids and bases (which are discussed in a slightly different context,
e.g., by Stanford and Kitcher 2000: 115–119). Acids were historically defined in
terms of their macroscopic, phenomenological properties, such as their sour taste
and corrosiveness. But chemists have struggled to come upwith a proper definition
of acids and bases, one reason being precisely contextual variation (on the history
of acids, see Chang 2016: 41ff.). The most commonly used account derives from
the Brønsted–Lowry theory: acid-base reactions generally involve the transfer of
a proton (an H+ ion) from an acid to a base. Hence, we could define acids as proton
donors and bases as proton acceptors. However, the obvious problem in giving
a general definition for acids is that a variety of substances can undergo these
reactions and indeed some substances (called amphoteric substances), such as
water, can react both as acids and as bases, depending on their environment. So,
acting as an acid or as a base is something that cannot easily be defined without
reference to a given context. A given substance may act as an acid in most
environments, but there is nothing about the substance itself that guarantees its
behaviour as an acid, the environment must also be considered. Following this line
of thought, acids and bases could be understood as functional kinds.
An interesting feature of this case is that the relevant laws concerning acids
and bases, like all special science laws, will be ceteris paribus laws – laws that
allow for exceptions outside normal conditions. Now, let us grant (as, e.g.,
Fodor assumes) that laws do not need to be exceptionless to be ‘real’ (Fodor
1997: 162, fn. 2). We still need to ask: what are the relevant normality condi-
tions? Whatever these conditions are, they better not be determined, say, just by
the experimental setup. If we were to introduce a law that states ‘All acids are
proton donors’ based on experiments involving only water as the base, then the
ceteris paribus clause would rule out water itself being an acid. In fact, this used
to be the case with the definition of acids in the late 1800s, when the Swedish
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chemist Svante Arrhenius defined acids as compounds that increase the con-
centration of H+ ions that are present when added to water. Since water was
used as part of the normality condition, it is obvious that water itself could not
be classified as an acid or base according to this definition. Moreover, any laws
to be derived based on this theory would not be able to account for cases where
the reacting substances do not contain the relevant hydrogen ions. So, the
correct ceteris paribus clause in this case would instead have to be based on
the underlying chemical properties of the participating substances, and the
Brønsted–Lowry theory enables this, since it is no longer necessary that
a substance should be composed of hydrogen (H+) or hydroxide (OH-) ions
in order to be classified as an acid or a base.
This brief example serves as our first warning sign: we should recognise that
there could be differences in lower-level properties (here, the chemical proper-
ties of substances participating in acid-base reactions) that could make
a difference in how we classify higher-level kinds (here, the classification into
acids or bases). Otherwise, we may end up arbitrarily ruling out relevant lower-
level differences based on nothing but the fact that we have not conducted any
experiments where these differences would be observable. Therefore, an appeal
to special science laws as the motivation to postulate distinct higher-level kinds
is not enough on its own. I have previously labelled this as ‘the problem of
lower-level vengeance’ (Tahko 2020).
The account that is emerging here plays into the hands of the ontological
reductionist because higher-level kinds turn out to be dependent on lower-level
kinds in precisely the way that the ontological reductionist claims. The fact that
special sciences generally involve ceteris paribus laws introduces a prima facie
challenge for the anti-reductionist, because the relevant normality constraints
may also require reference to lower-level kinds, hence undermining the autonomy
of the special science laws. Regarding the unity of science, the upshot is clear:We
have to consider dependence relations all the way down tomake sure that we have
the full picture, to determine the complete set of identity-criteria of a given natural
kind. These dependence relations are important for ontologicalmodels of unity, as
they help us determine whether the relationship between higher-level and lower-
level phenomena is ontologically reductive or non-reductive.
3.2 The Case of Haemoglobin
As a somewhat more detailed case study, I will consider the haemoglobin
molecule.11 Haemoglobin binds and transports oxygen in blood, releasing it
11 This example is partly inspired by Max Kistler’s (2018) recent work. Goodwin (2011: 535)
mentions the case in a footnote, and Tahko (2020) goes into further detail.
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in cells. Roughly speaking, the biological function of haemoglobin is its ability
to bind and release oxygen –more accurately, to carry oxygen from the lungs to
the tissues and return carbon dioxide from the tissues to the lungs. The haemo-
globin molecule is constituted by four polypeptide chains: two alpha chains
(alpha helices) and two beta chains (pleated sheets), which have different
sequences of amino acid residues but fold up to form similar three-
dimensional structures (as in Figure 3). Only nine of the amino acid residues
per globin chain in functionally identical haemoglobin molecules are present in
all (functionally identical) haemoglobin molecules. Variations elsewhere in the
sequence do not alter the functional profile. So, it appears that we are dealing
with a case of multiple realisation, where several different microstructures can
produce the same biological function.
In a biological context, we can take two distinct macromolecules (polypep-
tides) as two instances of haemoglobin, whereby both macromolecules are
effectively treated as the same protein, despite microstructural differences.
Hence, ‘haemoglobin’ might serve as a label for a class of proteins defined
not only in terms of their microstructural features but also in terms of their
functional profile.12 But we need some more detail about protein structure to
assess the example. It is at the level of tertiary protein structure, the three-
dimensional combination of alpha and beta chains, where we see the biological
function of the protein. There can be several different primary structures that
produce the same functionality. This is a common feature of proteins.
Significantly different primary structures can produce very similar three-
dimensional structures, sufficiently similar in order to produce the same func-
tionality. This is true in the case of the various haemoglobin molecules as well.
One aspect of variation in haemoglobin concerns its affinity for oxygen. For
instance, since foetuses cannot breathe for themselves, the haemoglobin mol-
ecule active in foetal blood has a very high affinity for oxygen (there are three
different haemoglobins in effect at different stages of foetal development). After
birth, this affinity decreases. While it is important that haemoglobin has a high
affinity for oxygen, it is also important that the oxygen gets released when
needed. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the haemoglobins between adult
mammals of different species may bear more similarities with each other than
those between the adults and foetuses of the same species. In fact, haemoglobin
can modify its affinity for oxygen depending on its chemical environment, since
the adaptability of haemoglobin is tied precisely to its environment (compare
this to the case of so-called moonlighting proteins, discussed in Tobin 2010b).
12 Compare this with Bird (2018b), who argues that evolved functional properties may be con-
sidered to be macro powers.
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One property that influences haemoglobin’s affinity to oxygen is the pH value of
the environment.
The question that the ontological reductionist faces is whether we can account
for the capacities of the haemoglobin molecule in terms of its primary structure. If
these capacities are present only at the level of tertiary structure, then this would
appear to be a case ofmultiple realization which is problematic for the ontological
reductionist. But why should one think that various primary structures do not all
have the same functional capacities? Here we ought to recall Goodwin’s point: the
case of proteins is analogous to that of organic molecules that may be classified
according to distinct functional types. One way to think about these capacities is
in terms of dispositional properties that may or may not manifest. The case of
acids and bases which we discussed in the previous section is a good example.
The initial problemwith the simple idea that acids are proton donors and bases are
proton acceptors is that a variety of amphoteric substances can act both as acids
and bases, and this variation will depend on the environment. Yet it would be odd
to claim that the capacity of an amphoteric substance to react as either an acid or
a base is something over and above its microstructural properties, something that
the substance gains only when the relevant environmental circumstances are in
place. The thought here is that the capacity to behave in certain ways in different
environments can be fully analysed in terms of the intrinsic properties of the
substance. After all, both losing a proton (reacting as an acid) and gaining a proton
(reacting as a base) are simple chemical reactions that are determined by the
relevant molecular structures and we understand these reactions very well. There
is no reason to think that we could not accurately capture acid-base interactions in
terms of molecular structure, as the capacity to act as an acid or a base is
contained, dispositionally, in that structure.
We are now in a position to give an analysis of one important aspect of
haemoglobin’s functional profile in the lines of reductive ontological unity.
Amino acids, which have a carboxylic acid group and an amino group (base),
are also amphoteric. As we know, proteins are made up of amino acids, and
accordingly they can also react as amphoteric substances. So, it turns out that at
least some of the interesting capacities of proteins, some of their functional
promiscuities, derive precisely from their amphoteric nature, which we have
just explained in terms of molecular structure. This looks like a straightforward
case of ontological reduction. So, the upshot of this case study is that the
biological function of proteins like haemoglobin may, at least partially, be
reduced to their microstructure. Indeed, in the case of haemoglobin, its ampho-
teric nature is in an important role when it comes to oxygen equilibrium; if we
want to explain the oxygen affinity of haemoglobin, we will ultimately have to
refer to its amphoteric nature.
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So, it looks like we can give an analysis of this case that could satisfy the
ontological reductionist. This contrasts with, for example, Jordan Bartol (2016:
543), who recommends that we should adopt a ‘dual theory’ of chemical and
biological kinds with respect to macromolecules such as proteins, driven by issues
surrounding multiple realisation. This would result in non-reductive ontological
disunity and entail a type of ontological pluralism about kinds. Note however that
I do agree with Bartol when he points out that there could be pragmatic reasons to
adopt different classificatory practices, so nothing we have seen above rules out
pluralism modelled in the sense of non-eliminative semantic disunity. Continuing
this line of thought, Havstad has argued that the primary structure of proteins is not
sufficient to account for protein individuation in biological practice. She thinks
that we need to consider the aetiological constraints as well and that these
constraints are difficult to account for in microstructural terms. (I discuss this
issue inmore detail in Tahko 2020.)Moreover, even if we knew everything there is
to know about evolution and were able to reconstruct this in microstructural terms,
we might nevertheless prefer a taxonomy of the relevant biochemical kinds driven
by considerations of biological practice. So, does this support disunity/pluralism?
Yes, but arguably only of the epistemic/pragmatic type that enables semantic
pluralism and can be reconciled with ontological reductionism. Let me now
move on to another case study.
3.3 The Case of Electronegativity
This case study comes from the chemistry-physics interface. The question is,
can we give an ontologically reductive analysis of chemical properties in terms
of physical properties? We should start by making an observation about the
distinction between chemical and physical properties quite generally, as this
distinction is by no means uncontroversial. For instance, in the nineteenth
century, the boiling and melting point were still considered to be physical
properties, not necessarily connected with the chemical properties of
a substance (Needham 2008: 66–67). Moreover, Paul Needham notes that ‘[i]t
was sometimes taken as an argument against the reduction of chemistry to
physics that physics couldn’t possibly provide for the chemical characteristics
of substances’ (ibid., 67). The situation changed once atomic numbers were
understood as encompassing the crucial guidelines for chemical properties.
Perhaps the simplest case that we can consider here is the reducibility of the
chemical properties of a molecule to the molecule’s proper parts (and their
properties), the elements and subatomic particles that compose the elements (for
relevant discussion, see Le Poidevin 2005, Hendry 2010, van Brakel 2010,
Needham 2011, Seifert 2017, 2019, and Tahko 2012, 2015b).
34 Philosophy of Science
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108581417
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 83.160.98.210, on 24 Nov 2021 at 12:34:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
There are good reasons to start with the most discussed example in philoso-
phy of chemistry: water. Water has special importance for us as living organ-
isms, but it also has many interesting chemical properties despite its relatively
simple structure. We also have a relatively good understanding of what the
corresponding physical properties responsible for chemical properties like the
boiling and melting point (of water) are. Water’s atypically high boiling point is
explained by hydrogen bonding. When several water molecules are present,
they form hydrogen bonds with each other, resulting in a network of hydrogen
bonds. Similarly, many of water’s other interesting properties, such as its
surface tension, derive from the polarity of the water molecule and the resulting
bonding behaviour. All this is at the level of chemistry, but we can further
analyse hydrogen bonding in terms of electronegativity. A hydrogen bond
between two molecules forms when two electronegative atoms, such as hydro-
gen and oxygen, are close enough to attract each other. Electronegativity,
according to the standard definition formulated by Linus Pauling, is the chem-
ical property that acts as a measure of the tendency of an atom to attract
a bonding pair of electrons. Figure 4 illustrates the electronegativity of oxygen
(3,44) and hydrogen (2,20) atoms in an H2O molecule. Figure 5 illustrates
hydrogen bonding between H2O molecules.
This is where things start to get interesting. Electronegativity, which is
generally understood as a chemical rather than a physical property, does not
have an obvious reductive explanation in terms of more fundamental, physical
properties, at least not in the sense that we could give a specific set of physical
properties and identify these with electronegativity. There are two issues that we
should consider here:
Figure 4 Permanent dipole of water molecule.
Source: Wikimedia Commons (2014): ‘Dipoli_acqua.png’ (CC-BY-SA-3.0), available
at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dipoli_acqua.png.
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1. Electronegativity is a relational property. It describes the magnitude of the
interaction between an atom’s valence electrons – electrons on the outer
shell – with those of another atom.
2. As we already saw in the case of water, electronegativity is mainly relevant
as a property of an atom as part of a molecule.
Both of these issues complicate the analysis of electronegativity, although they do
not of course block ontological reduction entirely, since the configuration of the
valence electrons clearly has a key role. We might say that whatever electronega-
tivity is, it somehow derives from this configuration of the valence electrons. But
the point is that we would struggle to replace the notion of electronegativity in
chemistry with the configuration of valence electrons. An additional point of
interest is that although themagnitude of electronegativity is influenced by atomic
number and the valence electrons’ distance from the atom’s nucleus, electronega-
tivity itself is not something that can be directly measured; instead, there are
a variety of different methods of calculating it from other properties that the
relevant atoms and molecules have. When I say that electronegativity cannot be
directly measured, I mean that electronegativity must always be measured in
relation to other properties, such as bond energies, and it does not have a unit. All
this means that while electronegativity is clearly dependent on nuclear charge and
electron configuration, it would seem problematic to simply replace it in chemical
practice with these properties. This would misrepresent the relational aspects of
electronegativity as well as its role in determining the chemical properties of
molecules (i.e., some information would be lost).
This result speaks clearly in favour of the semantic anti-reducibility of
properties such as electronegativity, and hence non-eliminative semantic
Figure 5 Hydrogen bonds between water molecules.
Source:OpenStax (2013): ‘Anatomy and Physiology’ (CC-BY 4.0), available at https://
openstax.org/books/anatomy-and-physiology/pages/2-2-chemical-bonds.
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disunity on the side of epistemic/pragmatic models of unity. More speculatively,
on the side of ontological models of unity, this gives rise to the question of
whether electronegativity could be an emergent property, introducing causal
powers irreducible to fundamental physical properties, which would entail non-
reductive ontological disunity. At the very least, the idea that we can see
emerging from this discussion is that there plausibly could be chemical proper-
ties that are, in a sense, fundamental, due to being irreducible to more funda-
mental physical properties. And this is the case even though we know that there
are more fundamental physical properties that influence, and perhaps deter-
mine, the relevant chemical property. Moreover, even though the presence of
these more fundamental physical properties may be necessary for the relevant
chemical properties, it might not be sufficient. It is not sufficient for the
emergence of chemical properties such as electronegativity that all the relevant
lower-level properties are present, since we have just observed that electronega-
tivity is mainly relevant only as a property of atoms when they are a part of
a molecule. So, as we have seen in other examples, we cannot define such
properties without reference to their environment.
One question that we might like to ask, prompted by this case study, is how
much do we need to know in order to conclude that some higher-level property is
ontologically reducible? None of the examples that I have mentioned throughout
this Element have demonstrated anything near a complete ontological reduction.
But at some point, when we know enough about the dependence relations
between a higher-level property and some set of lower-level properties, we
seem to be in a position to say that a complete ontological reduction is possible
or at least very likely, even if we were not yet (or ever) in the position to state all
the relevant bridge laws. However, and in contrast, not just any dependence
relation is enough. For instance, in the case of electronegativity, what I have
said previously is hardly enough for a complete ontological reduction, even
though we can point to a clear (compositional) dependence between electronega-
tivity and the relevant valence electrons. In addition, wewould need a muchmore
detailed account of the underlying quantum chemistry (for discussion, see, e.g.,
Llored 2012). Still, the reason for favouring ontological reductionism is clear: so
far, we have not encountered clear violations of it. For the friend of ontological
unity, this is of course very good news: we can salvage as many higher-level
predicates as we like, but at the end of the day, we know it to be very likely that
there is a complex network of dependence relations that connects all of science,
even if we cannot list all of these relations, and hence cannot eliminate the higher-
level predicates – we can still be semantic pluralists.
I will conclude this section by noting that there is another line of argument
available that challenges reduction at the chemistry-physics interface. This
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argument was introduced by Needham (2011). Needham argues that there are
no good reasons to accept microessentialism, the thesis that chemical sub-
stances must be characterised in terms of their microstructure. Instead,
Needham proposes that we characterise chemical substances in terms of their
macroscopic properties. Needham is mainly reacting against natural kind
essentialism based on intrinsic (non-relational) properties familiar from the
work of Saul Kripke (1980) and Hilary Putnam (e.g., 1975). Accordingly, I do
not think that the argument is quite as damaging against more developed forms
of natural kind essentialism (as discussed in Tahko 2015b). The important point
here is the need to characterise chemical substances at least partlymacroscopically.
Philosophers of chemistry have long resisted natural kind essentialism’s poster
child, namely, the over-simplified identification of water and H2O. Needham’s
central message can be captured with this striking quote: ‘A scientific character-
isation needn’t be amicroscopic characterisation’ (2011: 7; see alsoWilliams 2011
on the intrinsicness requirement; this point has more recently been bolstered in
Havstad 2018). But once we realise that the unity of science need not be supported
by a commitment to such a strong form of reductionism, it should be clear that the
question of microstructural versus macrostructural approach to chemistry does not
settle the issue about ontological unity. Indeed, there may still be some hope for
a qualified version of microstructural natural kind essentialism even if we do take
Needham’s arguments onboard – namely, a version acknowledging that the
context and environmental interaction of chemical substances need to be taken
into account.
3.4 Unity of Science and Ontological Reductionism
The hope for unity of science was originally part of a logical empiricist dream of
explicit eliminative semantic unity and implicit reductive ontological unity, the
search for a simple relation of explanatory dependence, both at the epistemic
and the ontological level. We have known for a long time that this dream was
overly ambitious and indeed quite implausible, given the complexity of science
and the need for semantic pluralism. But the notion of the unity of science
should not remain tied to this long-abandoned endeavour. Given the complexity
of science and indeed our own psychological limitations, we need to be open-
minded about the various models, methodologies, and theoretical concepts
employed in science. In this sense, pluralism – the disunity of science – is
obviously alive and well. However, I hope that for those who have read the book
this far, it should also be clear that relatively few arguments raised against
reductionism and the unity of science, and in favour of pluralism, target the
ontological dimension of unity. And even when the arguments are about
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ontology, I have tried to demonstrate that there is much controversy about
whether the arguments establish that there is genuine ontological disunity or
just epistemic shortcomings or pragmatic issues deriving from scientific prac-
tice. None of this is supposed to downplay the importance of such epistemic and
pragmatic issues, but we should not be misled about what these issues amount
to: they concern the ways in which we do science, not the underlying ontology
of reality.
We may further clarify the two levels of inquiry that are intertwined here by
focusing on two explanatory goals. One of these goals is at the level of ‘surface
discourse’ (i.e., it is primarily pragmatic). I take the notion of ‘surface dis-
course’ from Goodwin (2011: 535), but I should note that Goodwin does not
appear to use this notion of surface discourse in any pejorative sense. Rather, the
idea is that the necessary preservation of certain higher-level predicates at the
level of surface discourse suggests a commitment to semantic anti-
reductionism, whereby the predicates of the special sciences can still serve an
invaluable, even indispensable role (see Gillett 2007: 195, 2016: 16).
Given the important role of the special science predicates, eliminative
semantic unity now seems like a non-starter. But the ontological reductionist
only insists that it is, at least in principle, possible to find lower-level truth-
makers for the higher-level, special science talk, where ‘in principle’ can mean
that we will never actually be able to do this, even if science were to be
completed. Why is it so important to appreciate this difference? The reason
for this is something that John Heil has captured in a very striking way: if we do
not properly distinguish ontological matters from the semantic and epistemic
import of science, there is a risk that we end up ‘reading off’ features of the
world from features of our language (Heil 2003b: 218).13 This does not mean
that we should not pay attention to scientific practice or map the various
competing models that science employs. Even when a number of these models
turn out to be incompatible, they may nevertheless all turn out to be valuable in
some way (cf. Mitchell 2002,2003 ). But there is just one world, and insofar as
we do not find any genuine cases of strong emergence, then there is some
consistent set of worldly dependence relations that ultimately underwrites all
these models. Our models may turn out to be abstractions or idealisations that
only capture some aspects of those worldly dependencies (cf. Knox 2016) – and
this is perfectly fine – but none of this undermines ontological unity.
Let me conclude this section with a conciliatory note. Even if we must be
ontological reductionists to salvage the (ontological) unity of science, this does
13 See also Ney (2010: 442), where she makes the point that a reductionist can consider higher-level
phenomena to be ‘abstractions from concrete microphysical situations’.
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not take anything away from the practice of higher-level sciences like biology or
chemistry. More generally, the status of a scientific discipline does not depend
on there being a set of genuine, ontologically irreducible higher-level kinds or
special science laws that we can associate with it. However, the ontological
reductionist recognizes that the higher-level goings-on depend on the lower-
level goings-on in some important respects even when there is higher-level
autonomy with respect to certain degrees of freedom (cf. Wilson 2010). This
means that even if higher-order scientific language includes some indispensable
classificatory practices or natural kind predicates, this does not entail onto-
logical pluralism about natural kinds.
The upshot is a modest type of ontological reductionism that is compatible
with a similarly modest type of semantic pluralism. But there is one big issue
that remains open, now that I have argued that we are still entitled to pursue
ontological unity: where does that ontological unity stem from? I have hinted at
a few alternatives, such as Gillett’s compositional reductionism, which suggests
that we account for the ontological status of higher-level entities in terms of
their component entities (but note that as Aizawa and Gillett (2019) argue, we
should be pluralist about those compositional explanations as well). But this
still leaves the ultimate ontology of those component entities open, and indeed
we have many, many options regarding that ontology. My preferred strategy for
laying out this ontology is by looking at the notion of a natural kind. This choice
is easy to justify, since we saw that the notion of natural kind was central already
in the original debate about unity between Fodor and Kim. But now we have the
tools to make the underlying ontology much more precise.
In the next section, I will argue in favour of a unified theory of natural kinds –
natural kind monism – as this enables us to preserve a core motivation for the
old search for the unity of science as well.
4 Unity of Science and Natural Kinds
In Section 2 we saw that the influential debate between Fodor and Kim led to the
normalisation of pluralism: the phenomenon of multiple realisability and failure
of eliminative semantic unity are widely taken to show that there are plausibly at
least some genuine higher-level natural kinds. In Section 3 we saw that despite
the dominance of semantic pluralism, there is still room for ontological unity.
What remains to be done is to give an account of the ontological basis of that
unity. I propose that this can be best done by adopting natural kind monism:
Natural kind monism: The view that there is a single notion of ‘natural kind’ and
anything falling under that notion can be defined in terms of the same general
set of identity-criteria.
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The first obvious question about this view is whether we should link it to the
ontological models of unity and hence the structure of reality or whether it links
to epistemic/pragmatic models of unity and the structure of scientific theories.
I intend the first reading: natural kind monism should be understood as an
ontological position about what the notion of ‘natural kind’ refers to within
the structure of reality. Hence, the view suggests that we need to postulate just
one fundamental ontological category to account for natural kinds. This still
allows us to accommodate semantic pluralism about higher-level kinds. When
we ontologically reduce a higher-level kind to a lower-level kind, we are dealing
with one set of properties, the combination of which realises the higher-level
kind – that is, in the line of ontological reductionism, the truthmakers for higher-
level-kind talk are to be found from lower-level kinds. To clarify how
I understand this view, let me cite a passage from a recent paper by Jordan
Bartol, where he proposes a distinction between two different senses of ‘mon-
ism’. Bartol is here interested in whether microstructuralism, the idea that kinds
are defined in terms of their (microstructural) parts, could provide a workable
sense of natural kind monism and indeed of the ontological unity of science:
First, microstructuralism offers monism in the fashion after which molecules
are naturally individuated. Call this ‘category monism’ (CM), since it is
monism about the ontological category, ‘kind’. Microstructuralism holds
that all chemical kinds are what they are in virtue of microphysical facts.
Contrast this with functional kinds, historical kinds, or relational kinds. If
these other brands of natural kind were admitted to our ontology then we
would have a plurality of kind categories. Second, microstructuralism offers
the promise of a single taxonomy. Call this ‘taxonomic monism’. Every kind
in the microstructuralist taxonomy is unique. (Bartol 2016: 537)
It is clearly ‘category monism’ that we are focusing on, since ‘taxonomic
monism’ could be understood merely as a pragmatic or semantic thesis. So,
natural kind monism is a promising way to systematise my preferred under-
standing of ontological unity, namely, reductive ontological unity.
So, what could a monist account of natural kinds look like? One popular
approach is natural kind essentialism (e.g., Ellis 2001, Tahko 2015b), but
natural kind monism should not be considered to entail an essentialist
account. Bartol himself focuses on microstructuralism, but monism can take
many other forms. Note however that I would not agree with Bartol that
microstructuralism necessarily promises a single taxonomy. One can be
a monist about the category of natural kind but still believe that we need to
(or at least can) be taxonomic pluralists (cf. Tahko 2020). This is the lesson
that I have been trying to make clear throughout this Element: reductive
ontological unity is compatible with non-eliminative semantic disunity. For
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instance, proteins may be classified in terms of their function, aetiology,
structure, or some combination of these, but this does not rule out a monist
approach to their ontological status. Bartol also associates monism closely
with reductionism and this is fine insofar as we are talking about ontological
reductionism and keep in mind that the view is compatible with theoretical or
semantic anti-reductionism and hence the indispensability of higher-level
predicates (as noted by Gillett 2007 and 2010: 188).
In contemporary literature on natural kinds, various forms of pluralism
dominate the discussion (e.g., Dupré 1995, Cartwright 1999, Mitchell 2003,
Chang 2016, Magnus 2012, Khalidi 2013, Waters 2016). A detailed analysis of
these various versions of pluralism is not possible here, but it should be noted
that some of them are ontologically pluralist, in contrast to the semantic plural-
ism that we have been discussing earlier. While semantic pluralism is compat-
ible with natural kind monism, ontological pluralism (e.g., Bartol’s [2016: 543]
‘dual theory’ of chemical and biological kinds) is clearly not. Instead of
attempting to do justice to the various version of pluralism about kinds, it
may be helpful to take a step back and discuss the more general issue of realism
first. The reason for this is that I believe that there are aspects of the contempor-
ary debate about natural kinds that have skewed the debate towards ontological
pluralism about natural kinds.
To understand the debate between pluralism and monism, we need to first
clarify that there is a shared sense of realism. If natural kindmonism is supposed
to lead to the ontological unity of science, then it must be committed to realism.
Note that at least some of the pluralist approaches mentioned earlier would not
share this commitment to realism (perhaps, e.g., Magnus 2012, Chang 2016,
Waters 2016), since these are sometimes combined with explicit pragmatism or
anti-realism. But then the debate is really about realism/anti-realism rather than
about unity/pluralism as such, so we must set it aside here. Recall that onto-
logical unity concerns ontological rather than epistemic or theory reduction.
The reason why this is worth pointing out is that while any account of natural
kind monism is plausibly realist, taxonomic monism need not necessarily be
realist. So, the first question is: what does realism about natural kinds amount to,
and is there a shared understanding of this realism between monists and plural-
ists? We can clearly see that if the answer to the second part of this question is
negative, then we need to first settle the question of realism before we even get
to the question of kindhood.
As a working hypothesis, natural kind realism may be understood as the
relatively weak thesis that there are entities – the natural kinds – which reflect
natural divisions in mind-independent reality. When laid out in this rather
ambiguous fashion, natural kind realism is a widely shared view and perhaps
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only opposed to the conventionalist view that the classifications we postulate
never reflect any natural divisions in mind-independent reality. However, the
interpretation of ‘natural’ is left open here, with the result that natural kind
realism encompasses several mutually inconsistent views.14 We may, however,
further specify the view on a very general level. A potentially helpful clarifica-
tion – even if it has been overused – is that natural kind terms ‘carve reality at its
joints’ (cf. Khalidi 1993). Accordingly, natural kind terms may be thought to be
the set of concepts that we use to refer to the mind-independent ‘joints’ of
reality. These concepts may carve reality to a varying degree of accuracy – and
sometimes we may be mistaken about whether a concept successfully carves –
but in order to avoid ambiguity, we can start with the idea that at least the
concepts that carve nature at its joints ‘perfectly’ constitute natural kind terms.
One initial source of concern is that the notions of ‘naturalness’ and ‘perfectly
natural’ have not been specified. Another source of concern, brought to light
already by John Stuart Mill (1843/1882) is the distinction between natural kinds
and mere groups of objects characterised by a shared natural property – for
example, chemical substances constitute a fairly plausible example of kind-
hood, whereas being acidic, or being green and round, are more plausibly
merely shared natural properties.15 Thus we have to distinguish between the
idea of grouping some set of entities together on the basis of one or more shared
properties, and the idea of grouping them together because they are of the same
kind. It may be a minimal, necessary criterion for shared kind membership that
two entities share at least some properties (taking note that many would deny
even this, especially in cases such as biological species which could be under-
stood purely relationally/historically; cf. Okasha 2002), but it is most certainly
not sufficient, because otherwise we would end up reifying all sorts of things as
natural kinds (e.g., all green and round things).
A more striking example: electrons and muons are both elementary particles
and they have the same charge (unit negative charge) and half-integer spin. But
muons have a much greater mass. So, while electrons and muons are indeed
14 The interpretation of ‘mind-independence’ is not uncontroversial either but should be under-
stood weakly: divisions in mind-independent reality do not depend on our conceptual schemes,
or on the presence of human observers. Moreover, the way that conventionalism is laid out above
is, of course, simplified and not many people would subscribe to it. For further discussion about
extreme conventionalism, see Tahko (2012). See Sidelle (2009) for a defence of moderate
conventionalism. I will discuss the mind-independence requirement in more detail in Section
4.2.
15 See Bird and Tobin (2018), Bird (2018a), and also Hawley and Bird (2011), where an initial
contrast between these questions is provided and one account of the ‘kindhood question’ is
presented. Regarding the case of acids, see Stanford and Kitcher (2000: 115ff). The thought here
is that there is no shared microphysical basis for different kinds of acids, only a functional role, as
discussed in more detail in Section 3.1.
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both members of the same higher-level kind ‘lepton’, and since they both have
a half-integer spin, it is clear that they are of two distinct kinds. When we are
giving necessary and sufficient conditions for kind membership, we should first
consider the narrowest kind. If we instead focused on some very broad kind,
like all things that have mass and extension, we would not get the desired result.
We can certainly make predictions about the behaviour of objects that have
mass and extension – for example, on the basis of the influence of gravity on
these massive bodies, but insofar as there is a more precise distinction to be
made, then we ought to make it. Once we do, we can see that shared properties
are not sufficient for shared kind membership. That is why we need an add-
itional constraint, something that explains why the properties are shared in the
first place.
We can capture these ideas with the following two constraints, the specifica-
tion of which will be my main task in the following section:
The naturalness constraint (NC):Members of a natural kind must share at least
some natural properties.
The kindhood constraint (KC): The reason why members of a natural kind share
a set of natural properties is because they are of the same kind.
Both KC and NC require further analysis before they can be deemed inform-
ative. The important work is done by the notions of naturalness and kind. There
have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind genuine or
real, often in terms of some further unifying factor, such as causal mechanisms
or laws of nature. These could be understood as ways of addressing KC – as
providing reasons for why certain properties are unified in a sufficiently strong
fashion to constitute a natural kind. However, there are subtle issues surround-
ing this question. My own preferred understanding of KC considers that the
kind unifies its properties. Specifically, what explains that members of a natural
kind generally share many of their properties is that the kind unifies these
properties. It may do so in terms of causal mechanisms or by other means, but
the reality of a natural kind is not derived from its unification principle. Rather,
it is something about the nature of the kind itself that explains why and how it
unifies certain properties.
Following this line of thought, KC itself suggests that the kindhood question
cannot be settled merely by listing a set of shared natural properties among the
members of a natural kind (even if this may be how we arrive, epistemically, to
conclude that they must be of the same kind). To repeat, it is a shared kind
membership that explains the shared properties (if any), not the other way
around. This leaves it open that there could be two members of a natural kind
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that do not have any properties in common, so strictly speaking, NC is not
required for the existence of natural kinds, but it is a plausible constraint, so
I will assume that it is true. I should note that KC does immediately rule out
some reductive approaches to natural kinds – for instance, views according to
which there is nothing more to being a natural kind than a shared set of natural
properties (see Tobin 2013 and Bird 2018a for discussion).
4.1 The Naturalness and Kindhood Constraints
The starting point of the naturalness constraint (NC) is that what is ‘natural’
about natural kinds is their correspondence with the mind-independent joints of
reality: natural kind terms aim to reflect the structure of reality. There are several
ways to cash out the distinction between natural and non-natural properties in
this sense (e.g., Lewis 1983). For some, resorting to naturalness is so obvious
that arguments in favour of it do not amount to much more than an appeal to
‘knee-jerk realism’ (Sider 2011: 18).16 However, onemight think that relying on
a David Lewis-style account of naturalness will not get us very far if we hope to
define natural kinds quite generally, because the focus of the discussion is not so
much on kinds, but rather on a nominalist account of properties – a nominalist
account denies the existence of universals. Yet naturalness may nevertheless be
the best candidate we have for clarifying the idea that not all properties are ‘on
a par’, as Cian Dorr and John Hawthorne (2013) put it in their lengthy discus-
sion of naturalness.
Rather than discussing the history of naturalness, we should instead focus on
the more pressing question of how we can put natural properties to use when it
comes to identifying natural kinds. This is an important issue for any account
that resorts to natural properties. Here, the most popular option seems to be
projectibility. As Tobin puts it: ‘The naturalness of kinds makes them projec-
tible; the observation of some instance of a natural kind Ka, licenses the
inference that any future instance of K will be similar to Ka and gives credence
to the belief that any future K will be similar to Ka’ (Tobin 2013: 165).
We first encountered projectibility in Section 2.3, when discussing the case of
jade. We can clearly see the important role that it plays in discussions of
naturalness and natural kinds. However, the key problem with projectibility is
that the inductive inference described by Tobin in this quote can be upheld
simply by virtue of shared natural properties between observed cases (cf. also
Kornblith 1993). In other words, as we have already seen, projectibility by itself
is not enough because it can give us false positives – cases where inductive
16 Sider (2011) presents an influential, Lewis-inspired account of natural properties but does not
discuss the kindhood question in any detail.
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inferences are upheld merely because of (perhaps accidentally) shared natural
properties.17 Tobin is careful to note that projectibility is only associated with
giving some credence to the belief that Ks observed in the future will be similar
to the previously observed instance. That’s because members of kinds need not
be similar in all respects. But we should similarly be wary of cases where
members of two distinct kinds share some properties. To control for this, we
need the kindhood constraint.
The kindhood constraint (KC) will cause immediate controversy. One reason
for this is the variation in the ontological weight that philosophers are willing to
admit for natural kinds. But since the kindhood question is here separated from
the naturalness question, perhaps we can make some progress. It is worth noting
that we should also distinguish the kindhood question from the universalism/
nominalism question.18 This is despite the fact that I will operate in the realm of
realism about natural kinds. We might compare this to the analysis of natural
kind realism by Katherine Hawley and Alexander Bird (2011: 206), who simply
assume the existence of universals and hence dismiss nominalism altogether,
limiting the discussion to those views that accept universals. I will focus on
these views as well, but since we have distinguished the kindhood question and
the naturalness constraint (NC), it may be possible to account for the relevant
type of unity doing the work in KC in some other way than by postulating
a universal. So, I think that one could be a realist with regard to KC but
a nominalist with regard to NC – that is, to deny that either natural properties
or natural kinds themselves should be understood as universals. The idea of
unity of science should not be settled on this basis, but this issue will ultimately
be faced by any account of ontological unity based on natural kind monism.
Even if we assume the existence of universals, a number of different options
remain. For instance, kinds themselves might be considered to be particulars
rather than universals, they might be considered as simple or complex univer-
sals (the latter option is preferred by Hawley and Bird), or they might be
considered as sui generis entities, forming one of the fundamental ontological
categories. Each of these approaches would give a somewhat different picture of
what is responsible for shared kind membership. I will not discuss the details of
these options. Instead, I shall focus on my preferred account. I favour the idea
that natural kinds form one of the fundamental ontological categories – this
would give them the highest ontological weight possible, and indeed I believe
that this gives us a very neat sense of unity of science as well. But what does this
mean?
17 For a helpful discussion of false positives with regard to the case of natural kinds, see Kendig and
Gray (forthcoming: sec. 3).
18 See Bird and Tobin (2018) for a lengthier analysis of the different options.
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Brian Ellis (e.g., 2001) and E. J. Lowe (e.g., 2006, 2015) have provided the
best-known accounts of kinds as a fundamental ontological category. Here we
will collectively group these views under the label of natural kind fundamental-
ism. This use of ‘fundamental’ should not be confused with fundamental physics.
Lowe specifies the idea as follows: ‘What does it mean to describe a certain
ontological category as being “fundamental”? Just this, I suggest: that the exist-
ence and identity conditions of entities belonging to that category cannot be
exhaustively specified in terms of ontological dependency relations between
those entities and entities belonging to other categories’ (Lowe 2006: 8).
An example may help, so let me borrow Lowe’s own example: if particulars
consist of coinstantiated universals or perhaps from bundles of tropes, then the
category of ‘particular’ cannot be fundamental in the relevant sense. That’s
because in that case, the existence and identity conditions of particulars would
be entirely specified in terms of the universals or tropes that constitute it (cf.
Keinänen and Tahko 2019). Lowe himself would include the category of
‘substance’ as one of the fundamental categories. It may be helpful to include
an illustration of his four-category ontology (Figure 6), which, as the name
suggests, postulates four fundamental categories.
We need not dwell on the details of Lowe’s ontology, but wemay note that the
top-left corner of Figure 6 (substantial kind universals) that is of particular
interest to us. Relatedly, for Ellis, kinds feature in three of his six fundamental
ontological categories, as substantive kinds (generic substantive universals),
dynamic kinds (processes, events), and property kinds (Ellis 2001: 97–98, 134).
For Lowe, there are two types of universal – substantial and non-substantial –
where the first corresponds with substantial kinds (i.e., natural kinds; 2006: 21,
33). So, in both ontologies, kinds feature among the fundamental ontological
categories, although for Ellis they are distributed across several categories and
Substanial kind universals Non-substanial universals
(properties and relations)
Tropes / ModesIndividual substances
Figure 6 The ‘ontological square’, modelled after Lowe 2006: 22 (author’s own
work)
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hence perhaps better regarded as a subspecies of universals. In any case,
I consider both Lowe and Ellis as proponents of natural kind fundamentalism.
Even if kinds were not fundamental entities in this sense, many would
nevertheless consider them as entities of some sort. (Bird [2018a] calls this
view ‘strong realism’.) In particular, one might regard natural kinds as emergent
entities. The homeostatic property cluster (HPC) theory familiar from the work
of Richard Boyd (e.g., 1991, 1999) could be seen as advocating this type of
view. In this case, the resemblance among the members of the kind would seem
to be derived from the role that kinds play in projectible, inductive generalisa-
tions. In other words, the resemblance between the members of a kind is
manifested via a shared causal structure; each kind is a property cluster kept
in homeostasis by a causal mechanism. But while this type of account has been
very popular, it is also clear, and well-known, that the account is unlikely to
apply to all (natural) kinds (see, e.g., Khalidi 2013: sec. 2.6, Magnus 2012,
Slater 2015). For instance, it is difficult to see what kind of causal mechanism
could be postulated to be responsible for the resemblance amongst chemical
elements: a shared atomic number and nuclear charge are not mechanisms in
HPC’s sense, but rather just individual (possibly essential) properties. The
situation is different in the case of biological species, of course, where the
HPC theory has proved to be quite popular (but see Khalidi 2013 for some
critical remarks about this). In any case, it does seem that the HPC theory could
at best offer only a partial account of kindhood – although various novel, more
extensive versions of the framework have been proposed (such as Slater 2015;
Bird and Hawley 2011 also put the HPC theory to broader use).
Take Matthew Slater’s version, where resemblance is derived from Marc
Lange’s (e.g., 2009) idea of the stability of sets of laws under counterfactual
suppositions (Slater 2015: 398ff.). As Slater puts it, the idea is that ‘certain sets
of truths are maximally invariant under counterfactual perturbations’ (ibid.,
398). So, if we make a counterfactual supposition which is consistent with the
members of a set, then we can reliably infer that, had the supposition been true,
the members in that set would still have been the case. The resulting ‘non-nomic
stability’ is important for Lange’s account of laws, but for our purposes, the
important point is that, on Lange’s account, it looks like the set of laws is the
only non-trivially non-nomically stable set. So, as Slater notices, there is ‘a
sharp distinction between the facts that are laws and those that are accidents’
(ibid., 399). Now, what makes this interesting is that Lange, in reply to
Rosenberg, has himself tried to apply this account of laws to produce a novel
account of the autonomy of functional biology. But this requires more restrictive
stability than we get with the set of all laws. All this will be easier to understand
with an example, so let me cite a passage from Lange, which Slater also cites:
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[I]t is of medical interest to know whether a given heart attack might have
been less serious had epinephrine been administered sooner, or had the
patient long been engaged in a vigorous exercise regimen, or had she been
wearing a red shirt, or had the Moon been waxing. But it is not of medical
interest to know whether the heart attack might have been less serious had
human beings evolved under some different selection pressure. A physician
might blame a patient’s untimely death on her smoking, but not on human
evolutionary history. (Lange 2004: 107)
So, Lange’s suggestion is that we can restrict the relevant range of counterfac-
tuals in terms of the interests of the special sciences – in this case, the medical
sciences. Slater reports sympathy towards this basic idea, but he rightly points
out that ‘there are some pressing concerns about the details of how interests
apportion modal space’ (Slater 2015: 400). This is also the concern that I have,
because the upshot of Slater’s account of kinds seems to become, as he puts it,
‘domain-relative’ (ibid., 403), due to the fact that the definition of stability (on
Lange’s account) is dependent on the interests of the relevant special sciences.
Now, Slater prefers to formulate the account in terms of ‘relevance’ instead of
‘interests’ (ibid., 401), but the domain-relativeness is nevertheless at the very
core of his account. It should be noted that Slater acknowledges all this – for
example, ‘if some kinds are domain-relative, the question of what kinds there
are tout court is not generally tractable’ (ibid., 404). But it is clear that this will
not satisfy those sympathetic to natural kind monism, because it is precisely
a singular – and realist – sense of natural kinds, tout court, that the monist
requires.
Whether Slater’s account satisfies natural kind realism is a more controversial
issue, but he does explicitly state, contra Lowe (2006), that on his account,
natural kinds are not an ontological category (Slater 2015: 406). On Kendig and
Grey’s (forthcoming) reading, Slater aims at a metaphysically neutral account
of natural kinds – something that they regard as incomplete without explicit
metaphysical presuppositions. Moreover, Slater’s account may violate what
I regard to be a minimal criterion for natural kind realism – namely, that natural
kinds reflect natural divisions in mind-independent reality. (I will return to the
mind-independence criterion shortly.) Moreover, any account that offers only
a partial solution to the kindhood question will be unable to account for the
ontological unity of science.
One competing account that attempts to provide a more unified approach to
natural kinds and is hence worth considering in this context is the one developed
over many years by Muhammad Ali Khalidi (e.g., 2013, 2018). Khalidi sug-
gests that ‘epistemic practices [in science] aim to uncover the divisions that
exist in nature’ (Khalidi 2013: 63). Or as he puts it some years later, ‘the
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ontological ground of projectibility is causation’ (Khalidi 2018: 1389).
Khalidi’s ‘simple causal theory’ of natural kinds has many benefits over com-
peting views and I find it to be one of the most clearly presented and detailed
accounts of natural kinds overall, but it is his take on the kindhood question
which I will take issue with. The reason for this is that Khalidi, like many others,
ultimately takes projectibility to be the most important guide to kindhood. As
we have already seen, this puts a lot of weight on the epistemic practices in
science and it is this feature that I believe to have skewed our conception of the
unity of science towards the epistemic/pragmatic rather than the ontological.
So, there is no question that Khalidi’s account is supposed to be realist, but
ultimately, any realist account will have to address the ontological dimension as
well, and the relationship between properties and kinds is one of the most
pressing issues here (see Khalidi 2013, sec. 6.2).19 Here is how Khalidi first
ties these together:
A natural kind K is associated with a set of projectible properties {P1, . . ., Pn}.
As Khalidi notes, this is surely not enough, as we also need an account of
what unifies the properties associated with a kind. The problem of finding
a reliable link between projectibility or inductive generalisations and natural
kinds is of course not new; here we return to the debate between Fodor and Kim
discussed in Section 2. Let me cite a passage fromRuthMillikan (whomKhalidi
also cites) to illustrate:
[A] natural kind corresponds not just to a projectable predicate, but must figure
as the subject of many empirical generalizations. No science consists of
a single generalization, nor of a heap of generalizations about different kinds
of things. A science begins only when, at minimum, a number of generaliza-
tions can be made over instances of a single kind, for example, over instances
of silver, or instances of humans, or instances of massive bodies, or instances
of, say, moments in the American economy. (Millikan 1999: 48)
Khalidi builds on this idea fromMillikan by introducing the requirement that there
needs to be ‘no shortage’ of projectible predicates associated with the kind K. So,
the inductive inferences that natural kinds support need to have a certain robust-
ness. What explains this robustness? Khalidi’s preferred answer is that there is
a causal link between the properties. Thus it is this causal ‘network of properties’
that distinguishes natural kinds from non-natural kinds –Khalidi coins this idea by
stating that kinds are the ‘nodes in causal networks’. In a little more detail, the
19 Interestingly, Kendig and Grey (forthcoming) argue that even epistemology-only accounts of
natural kinds, such as Slater’s (2015), will require commitments regarding the metaphysical
status of kinds. The same may apply more broadly to epistemology-only accounts of unity.
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thought is that there are some ‘primary’ or ‘core’ causal properties which are co-
instantiated with ‘secondary’ or ‘derivative’ causal properties, because the pri-
mary properties directly cause the secondary properties. An example of this
distinction that Khalidi gives is the case of gold atoms, where ‘the primary causal
properties of gold include atomic number 79 as well as a disjunction of mass
numbers, which give rise in turn to a cluster of other causal properties (e.g.
ionization energies, atomic radius, etc.)’ (the latter being secondary properties)
(Khalidi 2018: 1384). This is a sensible approach in that it allows for certain
variation in the secondary properties (for instance, some secondary properties
could be masked), while the causally prior primary properties would still be
present. Hence, we should identify the kind with these primary properties, even
if the kind is also associated with the secondary properties. The key question is of
course how the primary properties become co-instantiated. Here, Khalidi is
somewhat more tentative, but ultimately his account seems to be based on the
idea that the causal networks track laws of nature: ‘it seems that all we can say is
that some combinations of properties in the universe are allowable and others are
not, and that is ultimately a matter of natural law’ (Khalidi 2013: 205).
The upshot of Khalidi’s account, it seems to me, is that we must reduce the
kindhood question into a question about the laws of nature. But this, of course,
requires an account of laws, which Khalidi is surprisingly silent about. Moreover,
given the major role that causation plays in the account, there is a serious challenge
that emerges from the old Russellian line, whereby causation is thought to be
absent from the fundamental, microphysical level. This is, of course,
a controversial matter, one that we cannot discuss in detail here (but see Khalidi
2013: sec. 6.3 for discussion). In any case, if microphysical causation is denied, this
would seem to require one of two things: either we must give up microphysical
natural kinds altogether or we must posit two classes of natural kinds and account
for the fundamental physical kinds by some other means (an option that Khalidi
considers, with reference to Ladyman, Ross et al. 2007). But either option will be
alarming for the friend of ontological unity framed in terms of natural kind
monism, since they would both entail either giving up natural kind monism or
leaving a part of science – and arguably the most fundamental part – out of the
picture.
4.2 Mind-Independence, Cross-cutting Kinds, and the Hierarchy
Thesis
Before I present my own preferred account of natural kinds in more detail,
I would like to briefly discuss some pressing challenges for realism and monism
about natural kinds. I shall start with the role of the mind-independence criterion
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for the naturalness of kinds. I have noted in passing that a common way to
conceive of what is ‘natural’ about natural kinds within natural kind realism is
their correspondence with the mind-independent joints of reality (and indeed
I have defended this type of view before in Tahko 2012 and 2015b). But some
might find this criterion unsatisfactory, primarily because there are supposed
natural kinds that are at least partially mind-dependent, as we shall shortly see.
Indeed, this is a potential threat for the idea that a unified account of natural
kinds could truly support the ontological unity of science. For if there are
higher-level sciences that are ruled out from this unified account of kinds by
definition, then we are clearly not providing a complete unified picture. Now,
proponents of natural kind fundamentalism might argue that such supposed
higher-level kinds should be ruled out because they are subjective and/or
reducible to lower-level kinds. But showing this is by nomeans straightforward.
So, let us consider the issue in some more detail.
Two interesting cases of seemingly mind-dependent kinds are non-naturally
occurring transuranic elements such as the element with atomic number 99
(Einsteinium), and psychiatric kinds such as mental disorders – the latter being
mind-dependent by definition.20 However, I think that we need not worry about
such cases that seemingly violate the mind-independence criterion; indeed, the
thought that natural kinds need to exist mind-independently has sometimes been
misunderstood or misrepresented.
Khalidi (2016: 228) has helpfully listed the following four different ways to
understand the mind-independence criterion:
1. Mind-dependence of the kind vs. its instances
2. Causal versus constitutive mind-dependence
3. Contingent versus necessary mind-dependence
4. Mind-dependence versus theory-dependence
It is easy to see that kinds like Einsteinium will satisfy (1), given that the kind
itself (say, understood as a substantial kind universal) may be considered mind-
independent even if its instances (i.e., the specific Einsteinium atoms that
humans have synthesised) are, in a sense, mind-dependent. However, the case
of the various psychological and social kinds is more controversial, as one
might think that without any minds at all, such kinds could not exist. The details
will depend on whether one believes that kinds can exist without any instances –
something that I would find questionable, being sympathetic to the Aristotelian
20 I will set aside the complicated case of biological species here, but see Khalidi (2016) for
examples involving biological kinds. In the interest of transparency, I should note that I am
somewhat sceptical of including biological kinds among natural kinds in the first place, but this is
not the place to explore this complex issue.
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view that all universals must be instantiated in the actual world (for discussion,
see also Hommen, forthcoming).
Regarding (2), the second of Khalidi’s suggested ways to understand
mind-independence, the thought is that human minds may be causally
involved in the creation of certain natural kinds, but these kinds may never-
theless be constitutively mind-independent. Clearly, kinds such as
Einsteinium would count as mind-independent on this criterion as well,
whereas mental disorders might not. (3) brings in explicitly the idea
I mentioned in connection to (1), namely, that certain kinds, such as mental
disorders, could not have come about without human minds, whereas we can
perhaps allow for the possibility that kinds like Einsteinium could have been
created spontaneously in the natural world. (This may be controversial, given
the focused efforts required in creating such kinds.) Finally, the distinction
suggested in (4) attempts to make the case for mind-independence in terms of
ruling out social kinds such as money because their existence is dependent
merely on there being a relevant theory (i.e., economics), but Khalidi ques-
tions this, noting that it is certainly not the case that all social kinds are
entirely theory-dependent.
Indeed, Khalidi himself thinks that (1)–(4) are all problematic. Instead, he
proposes a fifth formulation, whereby the distinction between mind-
independent and mind-dependent kinds can be specified in terms of whether
the instances of the relevant kinds require humanmental activity to sustain them
as members of those kinds. If such a need exists, the kind is mind-dependent.
Even though this is Khalidi’s preferred way to understand the mind-
independence criterion and it does seem to provide a way to distinguish social
and psychological kinds from cases such as artificial elements, his main claim is
that this distinction does not provide a good ontological account for distinguish-
ing real or genuine kinds from ersatz kinds. More generally, he concludes that
mind-independence of the provided varieties should be considered irrelevant to
realism about kinds. I beg to differ.
In my view, the point of the mind-independence criterion for genuine natural
kinds amounts to this:
Mind-independence (MI): There is a set of objectively unified properties that is
being tracked by the relevant kind term.
So, what makes a set of properties ‘objectively unified’? This concerns the
relevant unification principle, the manner in which the properties are unified.
But it is, in fact, easier to say what makes a set of properties not objectively
unified: if the set of properties that a kind term tracks is based on some human
interests, then that set of properties is not objective and the kind in question is
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mind-dependent.21 It may help to give an example. Consider the phenomenon
of radioactive decay. When we say that something is radioactive and classify
various isotopes in terms of this radioactivity, we have in mind relatively
unstable nuclei. Nuclear stability comes in degrees, but we have never
observed proton decay and we classify nuclides as stable when they do not
spontaneously undergo radioactive decay. Yet this may all be because we have
not had sufficient time to observe such decay – and likely never will. In
a famous article, Freeman Dyson suggests that over a time scale of 101500
years, ordinary matter is radioactive – ultimately, all matter will decay into
iron (Dyson 1979: 452). But we are generally not interested in such incom-
prehensibly long time scales, and for good reason. Nevertheless, if Dyson is
right, the objective property of ‘radioactivity’ is much more promiscuous than
we ordinarily think – that is, when we have our interest-relative glasses on.
Properly speaking, it is not the property of radioactivity that is interest-relative
here, but rather the property of ‘nuclear stability’, as we ordinarily use it (not
to be confused with Slater’s use of ‘stability’ discussed earlier). But it is clear
that we would lose something if we stopped using the notion of nuclear
stability, because for virtually all of our scientific interests, it makes absolutely
no difference to us if a nuclide that we classify as ‘stable’ decays, say, in some
10100 years.
The previous example hopefully serves to highlight that just because a kind
or a property is mind-dependent does not mean that such a kind could not be
useful or that it could not track some causal structures. Rather, such a kind or
the associated set of properties satisfies some looser sense of cohesion or
unity, say, given a particular epistemic goal (although this is not to say that the
goals are purely epistemic). If we take the case of synthetic elements like
Einsteinium, the proper mind-independence criterion, is easily fulfilled: there
is an objectively unified set of properties (e.g., nuclear charge), which is
associated with Einsteinium. The fact that the existence of any given instance
of Einsteinium is dependent on human action is irrelevant. Moreover, the mere
fact that social kinds and psychiatric kinds are mind-dependent is not the
problem; rather, problems arise if the set of properties reified as a kind is
picked up on the basis of our epistemic interests rather than some objective
unification principle, whether or not the properties themselves are mind-
independent.
21 I acknowledge that there are complications regarding the notion of ‘objectivity’, as an anonym-
ous reviewer points out. I use this notion mainly because of its somewhat intuitive association
with mind-independence, but I should note that there are senses of objectivity which allow, say,
for intersubjectivity. For a comprehensive survey of ‘objectivity’, see Daston and Galison
(2007).
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For a natural kind realist, the main issue is that the kindhood constraint
(KC) is satisfied and that it is satisfied because the kind is genuine (i.e.,
satisfies the objectivity requirement specified by MI). There are a number of
ways that this genuineness can be captured, but according to my preferred
account, genuine natural kinds are substantial kind universals. Such substan-
tial kinds are associated with a given set of properties because the kind unifies
these properties. Hommen (forthcoming: [3]) puts this nicely: ‘[K]inds repre-
sent unified ways of being – both in an individual and in a collective sense:
they account for the modal and temporal stability of character both within
single particular objects and across what we then call different members of the
same kind.’ This may be contrasted with the view that Mill may have held –
namely, that at least fundamental natural kinds unify their properties as
a matter of brute fact. In other words, there are no causal connections between,
say, unit negative charge, half-integer spin, and the rest mass of electrons,
even though all three of these are presumably definitive of the natural kind
electron.22 This bruteness approach may also be found, for example, in
Chakravartty (2007: 171), who suggests that fundamental natural kinds,
such as electrons, have their core properties (mass, charge, spin) as a matter
of brute fact. Yet this is not the account that Hommen is advocating. It may be
the case that we cannot point to any causal mechanism or other clear explan-
ation for why certain properties, especially those of fundamental natural
kinds, cluster together. But instead of postulating this as brute fact, a natural
kind fundamentalist can see this as a justification for postulating natural kinds
as a fundamental ontological category. This is the account that Hommen
seems to favour, and one that we can also see in the work of Ellis and Lowe.
I shall outline this account in the next section, but first I would like to consider
one more challenge for natural kind monism in general: the possibility of
cross-cutting kinds.
The starting point of natural kind monism is that we can account for all
natural kinds in terms of the same general identity-criteria. But an important
addition to this, suggested by Ellis (2001) is the thought that an entity can only
belong to one (fundamental) natural kind. Probably no one is committed to this
idea in its strongest possible sense – which Khalidi (2013: 69) calls the mutual
exclusivity thesis, whereby there really is only a single natural kind that an entity
can fall under. This would entail, for instance, that an entity cannot belong both
22 Of course, it could turn out that we will one day discover such causal connections. Moreover,
even if there are no causal connections to be found, there could still be something about the
nature or essence of these properties that explains why they cluster together (thanks to Sam
Kimpton-Nye for highlighting this option). The account that I favour relies instead on the natural
kind universal electron, which explains the clustering (see also Keinänen and Tahko 2019).
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to the kind proton and fermion, even though all protons are fermions. But it is, of
course, very easy to weaken the thesis somewhat, so that an entity may indeed
belong to several genuine kinds at once, as long as these are a part of a nested
hierarchy. Since all protons fall under the more general kind fermion, it is easy
to see that there is nothing here that threatens natural kind monism – indeed, this
kind of hierarchy reminds us of Oppenheim and Putnam’s system of reductive
levels. This idea has come to be known as the hierarchy thesis (Khalidi 1993,
1998) and the key challenge to this thesis is the possibility of cross-cutting kinds
(e.g., Tobin 2010a).
Some common examples of cross-cutting kinds come from biology and
chemistry. In biology, such cases are extremely easy to find. Consider the
notoriously tricky kind, mammal. Humans are mammals, and so are mono-
tremes such as the platypus. The platypus is also oviparous, meaning that it
produces offspring by laying eggs, like birds. But birds and humans cannot be
classified together either as mammals or as oviparous. So, given the hierarchy
thesis, something must give. Proponents of the hierarchy thesis, such as Ellis,
may of course give up problematic biological kinds like a mammal. But the
problem is that even if we were to rule out biological kinds as real natural kinds,
there are examples further down the hierarchy as well. To borrow an example
from Tobin, albumin and renin are both members of the kind protein, whereas
renin and the hairpin ribozyme are members of the kind enzyme. However, the
hairpin ribozyme and albumin do not fit together either as enzymes or proteins.
Even though many enzymes are also proteins, not all of them are protein and
hence they are not a subkind of proteins, and nor are proteins a subkind of
enzymes (see Tobin 2010a for details; for comparison between biological and
chemical kinds, see Havstad 2018). This result has, unsurprisingly, been taken
to favour pluralism over monism (cf. Dupré 1995).
There are various ways in which friends of the hierarchy thesis could try to
accommodate problematic cases, by modifying or weakening the thesis or by
denying that the cases violating the hierarchy thesis amount to real natural
kinds. One way to do so would be to argue that when two kinds do overlap in
such a way that one is not a subkind of the other, then there must nevertheless be
something shared between them, such as a common underlying structure. Tobin
considers this strategy, applied to the case of enzymes and proteins:
It might be argued that the kind nucleic acid is the underlying kind of which
both enzymes and proteins are composed. Thus, there is a common under-
lying structure involved. We could certainly subsume the kinds enzyme and
protein under the kind nucleic acid and thus claim that [the common under-
lying structure view] can be supported. However, to do so would be mislead-
ing in that the kind nucleic acid masks distinct structural differences between
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RNA and DNA. These differences are indicated by the fact of higher-level
crosscutting kinds. Thus, to subsume them under a homogeneous grouping
would be ontologically misleading. (Tobin 2010a: 184)23
Tobin goes on to make the point that reduction is not straightforward in cases
such as this – the higher-level kinds here are multiply realised. Indeed, cases
such as proteins and enzymes are particularly tricky, because of their complex
three-dimensional structure which is responsible for a majority of their bio-
logical functions. (See Section 3 for further details on the case of proteins). As
Tobin argues, classifying proteins and enzymes strictly in terms of the under-
lying chemical structure would leave out many important details that we do in
fact need in science. This is a point bolstered most recently by Bartol (2016) and
Joyce Havstad (2018). However, as I argued in Section 3, it is possible to accept
this point – to admit that there are important scientific classifications that cannot
be captured in terms of the underlying chemical structure and hence accept
semantic pluralism – while also promoting ontological unity. Tobin suggests
that in cases such as the one at hand, ‘Reduction is precluded by the fact that
categories such as albumin and ribozymes are determinable categories’ (Tobin
2010a: 184). This is indeed evidence that points towards the indispensability of
these categories in scientific practice, but arguably it does not prevent onto-
logical reduction, which is compatible with theoretical or semantic anti-
reductionism.24
What conclusion should we draw from the case of cross-cutting kinds? For
the likes of Ellis, it means that we should abandon many higher-level kinds,
even if they are accepted as real classifications. Another approach is to go for
conventionalism about natural kinds, a view advocated by Hacking (2007b) and
dismissed by Tobin. This type of view suggests that classification is a matter of
convention or agreement, perhaps based on our pragmatic interests. We saw this
type of domain- or interest-relativeness with regard to Slater’s account of kinds
as well, but the conventionalist could go much further and be explicitly anti-
realist about kinds. Instead, the lesson that most realists about natural kinds
would draw is one of pluralism, albeit the semantic and ontological varieties of
pluralism sometimes seem to be confused here –Khalidi’s (2013: 72) take looks
like a type of semantic pluralism given that he distances himself from Dupré’s
apparent ontological pluralism. Tobin’s view is more conciliatory, as she argues
23 It may be worth noting that nucleic acid might not strictly speaking be a component of all
enzymes and proteins, but I take it that Tobin has in mind the key role of nucleic acids in
specifying the sequence of amino acids that compose proteins and many enzymes.
24 Compare with Kincaid (1990), who can be seen as arguing against the semantic reducibility of
biology into chemistry, and Gillett (2010: 188), who notes that semantic anti-reductionism is
compatible with ontological reduction; see also Tahko (2020).
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that an acceptance of cross-cutting categories does not entail that the boundaries
between them are arbitrary (Tobin 2010a: 189). So, in her view, one can be
a realist about natural kinds while accepting that some cases are cross-cutting.
I would agree that this is possible, as the hierarchy thesis itself is by no means
definitive of natural kind realism. In fact, even fuzzy boundaries may be
acceptable, as Khalidi (2013: 68) argues, and this certainly needs to be the
case if one wishes to retain realism about categories such as biological species.
Yet concessions at least to semantic pluralism may need to be made even in the
realm of (bio-)chemical kinds, as the case of proteins and enzymes demon-
strates. (For a related point about other chemical kinds, see Hendry 2012.)
So, what is the upshot regarding the unity of science? The results clearly
favour some kind of pluralism, but what kind? As I hope to have made clear, no
one really believes in eliminative semantic unity in the sense that entails the
denial of semantic pluralism. But some, like perhaps Dupré (e.g. 1995, 2012),
might take the provided results to favour ontological disunity and hence onto-
logical pluralism as well. It is not entirely clear just how strong Dupré’s sense of
pluralism really is, but it is in any case stronger than what Khalidi, for instance,
seems to have in mind (Khalidi 2013: 72). In my view, the resulting pluralism
here is arguably nothing more than semantic or taxonomic pluralism of the type
that we have already discussed in detail. If this is the case, ontological reduc-
tionism and reductive ontological unity are not immediately threatened, com-
patible as they are with semantic pluralism. It is now finally time to outline my
preferred account of natural kind monism, which arguably provides a very
plausible ontological basis for the unity of science.
4.3 Natural Kind Fundamentalism
I have already expressed my preference for natural kind fundamentalism – the
view that natural kinds, as substantial kind universals, constitute one of the
fundamental ontological categories (see also Keinänen and Tahko 2019). The
main interest for the view in the present context is that it provides an easy route
to natural kind monism and thereby ontological unity: if the real or genuine
natural kinds are only the kinds that can be associated with a substantial kind
universal, then we have a very simple answer to the kindhood question, and
hence a straightforward account of the identity-criteria for natural kinds. The
properties clustered together in entities that are members of natural kinds do so
because those entities are members of certain natural kinds. I should note that
I understand universals as instantiated (sometimes labelled ‘Aristotelian’
instead of ‘Platonic’) – that is, there are no uninstantiated kind universals in
a Platonic heaven. Rather, the instantiated universals are multi-located where
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their members are. This does invite further questions, of course. Let me antici-
pate one of them, regarding the status of kinds that have no actual members
(e.g., potential transuranic elements that have not been synthesised). My view is
that in such cases, we can often state what it is to be a (member of) the kind, but
strictly speaking the kind does not exist, since there are no instantiated univer-
sals. But we may nevertheless say that were an entity of kind K to come into
existence, it would have such and such properties because it is a member of kind
K (say, a yet-to-be-synthesised transuranic element).25 This is the case even if
no entity of kind K ever comes to exist in the actual world. Now, I would frame
all this in essentialist vocabulary – that is, the identity conditions of the
members of K state the general essence of kind K. But this is something that
I will set aside here (see Lowe 2008 and Tahko 2015b for more details regarding
the essentialist formulation).
Of course, there are many other challenges that remain for natural kind
fundamentalism, such as the question of our epistemic access to the genuine
kinds. I cannot hope to settle all these challenges here, and indeed it is not my
purpose to defend the view in detail (but see Lowe 2015 and Hommen,
forthcoming, for two excellent defences). It might nevertheless be interesting
to assess the view against some of the main competitors. One of them is the view
outlined by Bird and Hawley (2011), whereby natural kinds are complex
universals. On this view, natural properties may be understood in terms of
property universals and natural kinds would thus be bundles (i.e., complexes)
of such universals. Rather than engaging with this view in detail, let me raise
a simple challenge to it: some of the best candidates for fundamental natural
kinds do not comfortably fit into this picture. I have in mind fundamental
physical kinds such as fermions and bosons, which appear to be definable (or
at least distinguishable) in terms of just one natural property (namely spin:
fermions have half-integer spin whereas bosons have integer spin). If this is the
case, then it does not seem correct to understand these fundamental kinds as
complex universals. Instead, we could say that there are at least some natural
properties that constitute natural kinds on their own. Accordingly, we would
lose at least some of the initial coherence of the view defended by Bird and
Hawley. More importantly, we would struggle to address the original kindhood
question: which bundles of properties are genuine natural kinds?
Bird (2018a: 1420) makes a surprising suggestion regarding the connection
between kinds and properties. He proposes that Boyd’s HPC theory, which
suggests that properties cluster together (non-accidentally) in virtue of causal
25 Note that the ‘because’ is not a causal notion here; it refers to the source of the identity and
existence conditions of entities of kind K.
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mechanisms, could be generalised to all natural kinds and not just biological
kinds like Boyd himself perhaps intended. On this view, an HPC would be ‘a
particular species of complex universal’ (Bird 2018a: 1423). Now, the usual
challenge for generalising the HPC theory to all kinds is that it is compositional
in nature: the clustering together of certain higher-level properties is explained
by a lower-level mechanism. But when it comes to fundamental physical kinds,
there is evidently no lower-level mechanism to appeal to. Bird, however,
expands the account by appealing to laws of nature in addition to mechanisms,
and he considers this to ensure that when it comes to physical and chemical
kinds, the clustering is in fact much more sharply defined. Yet this once again
(as I argued in connection to Khalidi’s account) seems to reduce (or delegate)
the kindhood question to a question about the laws of nature. We may ask: why
do laws of nature cluster properties together in the way in which they do? Bird’s
answer will be tied to his dispositional essentialist account of laws (in addition
to the account of kinds as complex universals). My worry with this strategy of
explaining property clustering in terms of causal mechanisms or laws, quite
generally, is that this turns the explanatory order on its head. If the greatest
motivation to postulate natural kinds is that they support inductive generalisa-
tions, then it is the fact that natural properties systematically do cluster together
into kinds that explains why laws of nature hold. But if this clustering is again
explained in terms of the laws, then the account is circular. I do not mean to
suggest that Bird is committed to this type of circular explanation though – after
all, he does have a distinct account of laws, but one that is only available to
dispositional essentialists.26
My own view is closer to Lowe’s (2006) picture, and in particular I adopt the
distinction between two different kinds of universal: property universals (which
we may understand as natural properties) and substantial kind universals (i.e.,
the natural kinds), as we saw in Figure 6. Any complete account of ontological
categories should say something about how categories are related to laws of
nature and Lowe has already developed a sophisticated theory about the rela-
tionship between laws and kinds (see also Tahko 2015c). More precisely, Lowe
proposes that we should explain laws in terms of the natures of natural kinds (cf.
also Ellis 2001). The kind electron, for instance, has it as a part of its nature that
its instances have unit negative charge. This essentialist fact can then help to
explain various law-like regularities, such as the net negative charge of those
ions that have extra electrons. Instead of considering laws as relations between
property universals (like in the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory, e.g.
26 One possible route for the dispositional essentialist would be to argue that laws and the clustering
of properties are both explained by the essences or natures of the properties.
60 Philosophy of Science
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108581417
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 83.160.98.210, on 24 Nov 2021 at 12:34:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
Armstrong 1997: 223ff.), Lowe considers the truthmakers of laws as properties
and relations that characterise kind universals. Consider electrons, which have
a determinate mass, electric charge, and spin quantum number as their essential
properties.What accounts for the clustering of these three property universals as
necessary properties of the kind electron? As Lowe (2015: sec. 6) points out,
property universals and, say, the Armstrongian second-order necessitation
relations between them cannot do the job. The main problem here is that a set
of monadic property universals are clustered to constitute essential properties of
a natural kind in some of their co-located occurrences but fail to occur together
in others. For instance, muons can have the same spin quantum number and
electric charge as electrons, but they have a considerably larger mass.
We can omit the details of Lowe’s four-category ontology here and just look
at the basic structure, which introduces a kind of double primitivism: both
natural properties and kinds constitute a fundamental category. Consider
Figure 7.
An important feature that we can observe in Figure 7, even though it is of
course overly simplified, is that all natural kinds (small circles) are linked to
properties (triangles), but not all properties need to be linked to natural kinds.
There could also be natural kinds that are linked to just one property, but the
property and the natural kind are nevertheless distinct – hence the double
primitivism. For instance, some fundamental physical kinds such as perhaps
fermions and bosons might be definable in terms of just one natural property:
spin. Obviously, such examples are controversial, but it is a benefit of the






Figure 7 The relationship between natural kinds and their properties (author’s
own work)
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a single property is not ruled out. Although the picture does not illustrate it,
there is, of course, nothing that rules out one property being linked to several
different natural kinds; the property of spin, for instance, is linked to several
kinds. Moreover, the dashed circles on the property side illustrate the ability of
the kind to unify the properties – that is, the dashed circle may be regarded as the
unification principle in the case of a given kind, be it a causal mechanism or
something else. Based on this very simple framework, it is easy to explain why
I have been emphasizing that we can make inductive inferences just based on
properties rather than kinds. The reason is that there may be properties that are
not directly linked to kinds (although they can be entailed by kinds), such as
accidents or contingent properties – we may understand the ‘loose’ triangles to
be such properties. A contingent property of a member of a kind may of course
be ultimately linked to the kind as well, even if not directly through the kind’s
unification principle.
To provide an example, consider the diffraction of water waves. Diffraction,
the bending of waves around obstacles, is a feature of any wave, but it will of
course only be apparent when we have a body of water rather than just one water
molecule. Is diffraction a ‘core’ essential property of the kindwater (if it is a kind)
or just something that is entailed by the general essence of water?Well, one might
think that it is not part of the essence of the kind water that water waves should
diffract (even if it were part of the essence of the kindwave). If this is the case, we
may say that water waves are disposed to diffract, but the core properties ofwater
do not necessitate that water waves diffract. Now, all this should be taken with
a grain of salt because the example is somewhat esoteric. But we may consider
this to be a toy example, the main purpose of which is simply to illustrate the
connection between kinds, their core or essential properties, and contingent
properties that are dependent on the core properties.
One important upshot of this discussion is that even if there is a connection
between inductive, law-like generalisations and natural kinds, this connection
may not be necessary. In other words, there may be law-like generalisations
which do not feature natural kinds, and hence the explanatory significance of
natural kinds in certain inductive inferences does not, by itself, constitute
a sufficient reason to postulate natural kinds. In fact, a case could be made to
the effect that all the explanatory work required for inductive inferences could
just as well be done merely in terms of natural properties, without assuming that
the kindhood question requires an answer at all. Of course, this is not my own
view, but it is perhaps worth considering, because it would wreak havoc for the
important role of natural kinds in securing ontological unity as well.
Consider, for instance, inductive generalisations regarding the proportion of
black ravens in a sample of ravens or the expectation that two positively charged
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particles will repel each other, in accordance with Coulomb’s law. Could we not
explain both cases in terms of natural properties, regardless of whether we
consider ravens or even charged particles to constitute a natural kind? In fact, it
may be possible to explain at least the raven case without even any reference to
naturalness, since a random sampling of sufficiently many cases could perhaps
be considered a sufficient justification of the inductive generalisation, as Peter
Godfrey-Smith (2011) speculates (cf. also Strevens 2012, who uses the raven
case as an example). Be that as it may, the case of Coulomb’s law is of particular
interest due to its wide applicability: it applies to all charged particles.
Accordingly, if Coulomb’s law features a natural kind, this kind would have
to encompass all charged particles. On the face of it, the natural kind ‘charged
particle’ seems questionable, even ad hoc. One might think, following Ellis, that
such cases have to do with ‘global’ laws that involve higher-order determinable
natural kinds, even if they involve no fundamental natural kinds. Indeed, Ellis
himself would have a further possible reply since he accepts ‘property kinds’
such as ‘charge’ and ‘mass’ (Ellis 2001: 23). But these replies are controversial
to begin with: Ellis’s hierarchical view of natural kinds, property kinds, and the
idea of global laws involve heavy commitments and we have already discussed
some of the problems of the hierarchical view in the previous section.
So, postulating a natural kind to do the job where simple correlations of
natural properties are sufficient – as would seem to be the case with Coloumb’s
law and charged particles – seems unwarranted, at least if we do it simply for
explanatory purposes. Here I would agree with Bird, who states that associating
natural kinds with inductive success ‘promotes an overly liberal conception of
natural kinds’ (2018a: 1401). Having said that, explanatory significance may
yet have a role to play in this discussion, but, in my view, only to recognize the
ontological import of natural kinds. That is, natural kinds may ground the
explanatory significance of some law-like generalisations, but not everything
that is explanatory has to involve kinds.
There is much more to be said about the exact relationship between kinds,
their properties, and the properties that are not directly linked to kinds as well as
the relationship between kinds and laws (for discussion, see, e.g., Lowe 2006,
2015, Keinänen and Tahko 2019, and Hommen, forthcoming). It should also be
acknowledged that none of this is immediately helpful for addressing the
epistemic challenge of figuring out which natural properties indeed are linked
to natural kinds, but I think some progress can be made if we have an idea about
what the ontology could look like – we will leave the epistemic challenge for
another day.
In conclusion, what I hope to take from this discussion is simply that natural
kind fundamentalism provides one promising way to support my own take on
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the unity of science, namely a combination of reductive ontological unity and
non-eliminative semantic disunity. The toolbox for this combination employs
ontological reduction, semantic pluralism, and natural kind monism, the last of
which I have just specified in terms of natural kind fundamentalism. This
combination is certainly not the only way to defend ontological unity, but
anyone who wishes to defend ontological unity does eventually need to give
an account of the ontological basis of this unity, which is why a considerable
part of this Element deals with the important question of how natural kinds fit
into this picture.
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